The United States Coast Guard\u27s Law Enforcement Authority Under 14 U.S.C. § 89: Smugglers\u27 Blues or Boaters\u27 Nightmare? by Shelton, Greg
William & Mary Law Review 
Volume 34 (1992-1993) 
Issue 3 Article 10 
March 1993 
The United States Coast Guard's Law Enforcement Authority 
Under 14 U.S.C. § 89: Smugglers' Blues or Boaters' Nightmare? 
Greg Shelton 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr 
 Part of the Admiralty Commons 
Repository Citation 
Greg Shelton, The United States Coast Guard's Law Enforcement Authority Under 14 U.S.C. § 89: 
Smugglers' Blues or Boaters' Nightmare?, 34 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 933 (1993), 
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss3/10 
Copyright c 1993 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship 
Repository. 
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr 
THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD'S LAW
ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY UNDER 14 U.S.C. § 89:
SMUGGLERS' BLUES OR BOATERS' NIGHTMARE?
The Coast Guard is our ocean and border water police and pa-
trol force. If that service is not empowered to enforce the laws of
the United States -along our shores and in boundary waters,
those laws are unenforcible [sic], since there is no other agency
of this Government equipped to enforce them."
As President Bush hosted the leaders of several Latin American
countries at a "Drug Summit" in early 1992, many people were
questioning whether the enforcement of our nation's drug laws was
making any difference.2 Drug-related violence in our streets contin-
ues to escalate as the government spends ever-increasing sums in
an attempt to stem the flow of illegal drugs into our country 
3
South American source countries ask for increased aid from the
United States in what has become almost an auction of these na-
tions' attitudes toward illegal drugs.4 Demand reduction in
America remains an illusive goal; indeed, this demand has already
spawned development of new and more potent forms of previously
known drugs.
In the midst of this uncertainty regarding our national drug pol-
icy, one bright spot has been relatively constant. Since the Coast
1. 80 CONG. REC. 9166 (1936) (letter from C.M. Hester, Assistant General Counsel, Trea-
sury Dept., to Sen. Copeland) (advocating passage of a bill to define the jurisdiction of the
Coast Guard); see infra notes 134-39 and accompanying text for a full discussion of this bill.
2. Douglas Farah & Michael Isikoff, 'Drug Summit' to Convene as Supply Surges, WASH.
PosT, Feb. 25, 1992, at Al.
3. See Justin E. Fernandez, Drug Illegality Is Bad Public Policy: The Other End of the
Chain, 23 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. 151 (1992); Karen A. Klocke, Drug-Related Crime and Ad-
dicted Offenders: A Proposed Response, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 639
(1991).
4. See The Drug Summit in Cartagena, Colombia: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); William R. Long, Changing Lifestyles:
'Coca' Habit Hard to Break, L.A. TiMES, Apr. 7, 1992, at 6.
5. Crack is a recently developed derivative form of cocaine. Another derivative has also
appeared: ice, a smokeable form of methamphetamne, better known as "speed." The Men-
ace of Ice, TIME, Sept. 18, 1989, at 28.
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Guard entered the drug war almost two decades ago, the street
value of drugs seized by the service has far surpassed government
spending to support the agency in its law enforcement efforts.'
The Coast Guard is unique among United States armed forces in
many ways. Among other distinguishing factors, it is the smallest
of the five services' and is the only armed service given responsibil-
ity and authority for direct law enforcement action." Not surpris-
6. The Coast Guard seizes approximately $1.83 billion in illicit drugs annually. FY 93
Budget, U.S.C.G. COMMANDANT'S BULL., Nov. 1992, at 30, 31. The Coast Guard's 1993 budget
for the enforcement of laws and treaties, which includes drug interdiction efforts, is $1.01
billion. Id. Maritime seizure records continue to be set. In separate boardings in July 1991,
Coast Guard units accomplished the largest single seizure of hashish and the third largest
seizure of cocaine in U.S. history. These seizures netted over 70 tons of hashish and over
10,000 pounds of cocaine. See M.W Linehan, CGC Adak Seizes Drug Record, U.S.C.G. COM-
MANDANT'S BULL., Sept. 1991, at 3; John Moss, D14 Scores Huge Hash Bust, U.S.C.G. COM-
MANDANT'S BULL., Sept. 1991, at 2.
Drug interdiction is but one mission of the Coast Guard. The other primary mission areas
are: search and rescue, fishery law enforcement, aids to navigation, boating safety, marine
environmental protection, commercial vessel safety, and bridge administration. See Future
of the United States Coast Guard: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard and
Navigation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
30 (1990) [hereinafter CG Future Hearings] (background memorandum).
7. As of October 1, 1991, Coast Guard active duty strength was approximately 38,000
personnel. 1992 U.S. Coast Guard Overview, U.S.C.G. COMMANDANT'S BULL., Oct. 1991, at 1,
10-11 [hereinafter Overview]. By comparison, the next smallest service is the Marine Corps,
with an authorized strength of 193,735. Department of Defense Authorization for Appro-
priations for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993: Hearings on S.1507 Before the Senate Comm. on
Armed Services, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 30 (1991) (testimony of General A.M. Gray,
Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps).
8. The responsibilities of the Coast Guard, including its law enforcement duties, are out-
lined by statute:
Primary Duties
The Coast Guard shall enforce or assist in the enforcement of all applicable
Federal laws on, under, and over the high seas and waters subject to the juris-
diction of the United States; shall engage in maritime air surveillance or in-
terdiction to enforce or assist in the enforcement of the laws of the United
States; shall administer laws and promulgate and enforce regulations for the
promotion of safety of life and property on and under the high seas and waters
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States covering all matters not specifi-
cally delegated by law to some other executive department; shall develop, es-
tablish, maintain, and operate, with due regard to the requirements of national
defense, aids to maritime navigation, ice-breaking facilities, and rescue facili-
ties for the promotion of safety on, under, and over the high seas and waters
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; shall, pursuant to international
agreements, develop, establish, maintain and operate icebreaking facilities on,
under, and over waters other than the high seas and waters subject to the juris-
diction of the United States; shall engage in oceanographic research of the high
934
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ingly, the Coast Guard considers itself "the nation's premier mari-
time law enforcement agency " It is firmly committed to
continuing the "drug war" m the maritime area' and, accordingly,
drug interdiction is the most significant Coast Guard mission in
terms of effort dedicated and money spent."- A broad grant of en-
forcement authority from Congress coupled with an equally broad
deference by the judiciary to the use of that power has facilitated
this commitment. Congress provided its principal support of Coast
Guard law enforcement almost half a century ago, with a statute
that has not required amendment to meet modern exigencies.' 2
seas and in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; and shall
maintain a state of readiness to function as a specialized service in the Navy in
time of war, including the fulfillment of Maritime Defense Zone command
responsibilities.
14 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). Congress recently designated the Department of Defense as the lead
agency of the federal government for intelligence gathering and detection of drug smuggling.
See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-510, § 1004,
104 Stat. 1629 (1990), as amended by Pub. L. No. 102-190, § 1088, 105 Stat. 1484 (1991).
The Coast Guard is the only armed service with arrest authority. See 10 U.S.C. § 375 (Supp.
1I 1991) ("Restriction on direct participation by military personnel").
9. See CG Future Hearings, supra note 6, at 41 (statement of Admiral J. William Kline,
Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard). This expertise at stopping and boarding vessels was put
to the test in the Persian Gulf during operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, as Coast
Guard boarding teams working from Navy ships conducted the majority of boardings to
enforce the United Nations embargo against trade with Iraq. See John M. Broder & Paul
Houston, Iraqi Ship Is Seized by U.S., Cargo Diverted, L-A. TiMEs, Sept. 5, 1990, at 1;
William P Coughlin, Gaps Seen in Iraq Blockade; Boarding Officer Cites Sampling, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Nov. 22, 1990, at A7. The concept of Coast Guard personnel conducting opera-
tions from Navy warships was implemented in 1986 as an added method of increasing mari-
time drug interdiction efforts. See 10 U.S.C. § 379 (1988).
10. CG Future Hearings, supra note 6, at 7. This concentration on drug law enforcement
is mandated, to a great degree, by Congress in the budget process. Recent Coast Guard
budgets have included mmnum spending requirements for this mission. See Nomination,
USCG: Hearing on Nominations Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1990) [hereinafter Nomination Hearing] (prehear-
ing answers to questions, prepared by Rear Admiral M.H. Daniell, nominee as Vice Com-
mandant, U.S. Coast Guard).
11. CG Future Hearings, supra note 6, at 7 (statement of Admiral J. William Kline); see
also Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1991: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on the Department of Transportation and Related Agencies of
the House Comm. on Appropriations, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 395, 426 (1990) [hereinafter
1991 Budget Hearings] (testimony of Admiral Paul A. Yost, Jr., Commandant, U.S. Coast
Guard) (stating that 26% to 27% of Coast Guard operations are related to drug interdiction,
compared to about 10% 10 to 15 years ago); Overview, supra note 7, at 27 (detailing the
missions, personnel, and budget of the Coast Guard for 1992).
12. See infra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
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The courts, however, have fully endorsed unfettered authority for
the agency's law enforcement mission only during the last two de-
cades as a perceived need for this wide latitude arose in the con-
text of halting the flood of illegal drugs from South America.13
The Coast Guard's effectiveness in preventing the importation of
illegal drugs into the United States has not come without a price.14
Beyond the huge sums the federal government has spent on the
drug war, 15 vessel owners must accept as part of the "cost" of en-
joying waterborne business or recreation the possibility that the
Coast Guard may stop and board their boats at any time." For the
recreational boater who already faces pervasive regulations 7 that
require him to carry certain expensive equipment in order to enjoy
his leisure time aboard a vessel which itself requires a substantial
investment, the appearance of a Coast Guard law enforcement
team is particularly disturbing. 8
Americans are confronted regularly by law enforcement officers
both on our nation's roads and on our waterways. The legal rules
governing the enforcement officers' authority to make an initial
stop in these two places, however, are quite different. The highway
patrol or local police officer is governed by the reasonable suspicion
requirement which the Supreme Court announced in Delaware v.
13. See infra notes 142-317 and accompanying text.
14. As concern with the drug problem has grown, Congress has reacted by granting suc-
cessively broader enforcement powers to various federal agencies. These expansions are of
questionable constitutionality and may violate international law as well. See Mary B.
Neumayr, Note, Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act: An Analysis, 11 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 487 (1988); Jeffrey D. Stieb, Paper, Survey of United States Jurisdiction
Over High Seas Narcotics Trafficking, 19 GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 119 (1989); Michael Tous-
ley, Note, United States Seizure of Stateless Drug Smuggling Vessels on the High Seas: Is
It Legal?, 22 CASE W RES. J. INT'L L. 375 (1990).
15. The Pentagon's drug war budget almost tripled from 1989 to 1992, rising from $439
million in 1989 to approximately $1.2 billion in 1992. See Charles Lane et al., The Newest
War, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 6, 1992, at 18, 19.
16. See 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1988); infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text; see also Arthur
S. Hayes, Searches for Drugs Roil Boaters, WALL ST. J., April 30, 1990, at B1, B4 (discussing
the increasingly intrusive nature of Coast Guard and Customs Service boardings of pleasure
vessels).
17. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. §§ 155, 159, 173, 175 (1991); 46 C.F.R. § 25 (1991).
18. See infra notes 356-63 and accompanying text.
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Prouse."9 In contrast, Coast Guard boarding officers are not simi-
larly restricted under 14 U.S.C. § 89, which provides broad author-
ity for stopping vessels subject to United States jurisdiction.20
Ironically, the expansion of the scope of Coast Guard authority oc-
curred roughly parallel with a judicially engineered contraction of
the discretion allowed land-based enforcement officers.2 This
broad authority is obviously very useful to the Coast Guard in de-
tecting and interdictmg the smuggling of illegal drugs into the
19. 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (holding that under the Fourth Amendment's reasonable
search and seizure requirements, police may stop a motorist only if they have an "articul-
able and reasonable suspicion" that the motorist is in violation of a law).
20. The statute provides:
(a) The Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations, inspections,
searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the
United States has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection, and suppression
of violations of laws of the United States. For such purposes, commissioned,
warrant, and petty officers may at any time go on board of any vessel subject
to the jurisdiction, or to the operation of any law, of the United States, address
inquiries to those on board, examine the ship's documents and papers, and
examine, inspect, and search the vessel and use all necessary force to compel
compliance. When from such inquiries, examination, inspection, or search it
appears that a breach of the laws of the United States rendering a person lia-
ble to arrest is being, or has been committed, by any person, such person shall
be arrested or, if escaping to shore, shall be immediately pursued and arrested
on shore, or other lawful and appropriate action shall be taken; or, if it shall
appear that a breach of the laws of the United States has been committed so as
to render such vessel, or the merchandise, or any part thereof, on board of, or
brought into the United States by, such vessel, liable to forfeiture, or so as to
render such vessel liable to a fine or penalty and if necessary to secure such
fine or penalty, such vessel or such merchandise, or both, shall be seized.
(b) The officers of the Coast Guard insofar as they are engaged, pursuant to
the authority contained in this section, in enforcing any law of the United
States shall:
(1) be deemed to be acting as agents of the particular executive de-
partment or independent establishment charged with the administration
of the particular law; and
(2) be subject to all the rules and regulations promulgated by such
department or independent establishment with respect to the enforce-
ment of that law.
(c) The provisions of this section are in addition to any powers conferred by
law upon such officers, and not in limitation of any powers conferred by law
upon such officers, or any other officers of the United States.
14 U.S.C. § 89.
21. See infra note 333.
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United States.2 2 In terms of enforcement power, Coast Guard
boarding officers are clearly America's "supercops."
This Note examines the Coast Guard's law enforcement author-
ity under 14 U.S.C. § 89 and the rationale for this authority First,
it reviews the history of the statute and analyzes cases from the
Prohibition era and their applicability to modern drug smuggling
cases. Second, the Note discusses the judicial treatment of section
89 during the current "drug war" by looking at Supreme Court de-
cisions such as Delaware v. Prouse that have interpreted law en-
forcement powers under the Fourth Amendment. Finally, it con-
siders changes in Coast Guard policy and operations within the
authority of 14 U.S.C. § 89 and presents suggestions for future
policies.
DEVELOPMENT OF 14 U.S.C. § 89
Early History
In 1790, the first Congress of the United States created the Rev-
enue Cutter Service, the forerunner of the Coast Guard.23 At that
time, the government sought to generate revenue to pay the coun-
try's debt 24 by imposing duties, or tariffs, on goods imported into
22. This authority is also supplemented by other statutory provisions. For example, § 143
of 14 U.S.C. provides:
Commissioned, warrant, and petty officers of the Coast Guard are deemed to
be officers of the customs and when so acting shall, insofar as performance of
the duties relating to customs laws are concerned, be subject to regulations
issued by the Secretary of the Treasury governing officers of the customs.
14 U.S.C. § 143; see also United States v. Green, 671 F.2d 46, 51-52 (1st Cir.) (holding that
Coast Guard officers are empowered to stop and board vessels with Customs authority under
19 U.S.C. §§ 1401(i), 1581(a), 1587(a)), cert. dented, 457 U.S. 1135 (1982); United States v.
Guillen-Linares, 636 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that Customs regulations apply when
Coast Guard personnel act as agents of the Customs).
23. See Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, 1 Stat. 145, 164-65, 175 (repealed 1799); IRVING H.
KING. GEORGE WASHINGTON'S COAST GUARD 16-17 (1978). The legislative history of the early
sessions of Congress is limited, in part because the Senate sat in closed session from the
beginning of the first Congress in 1789 until February 20, 1794. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 15 (Jo-
seph Gales ed., 1789).
24. See Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 34, 1 Stat. 138, 138 ("An Act making provision for the
[payment of the] Debt of the United States") (alteration in original).
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the United States.25 Congress implemented a program of duties on
various goods in 1789;26 however, because no organization existed
to enforce the law at sea, smugglers easily evaded payment of these
duties.2 7 In order to provide for the effective collection of the cus-
toms tariffs, Congress included very generous enforcement provi-
sions in the statute creating the Revenue Cutter Service:
[I]t shall be lawful for all collectors, and the officers of the
revenue cutters herein after mentioned, to go on board of ships
or vessels in any part of the United States, or within four
leagues of the coast thereof, if bound to the United States,
whether in or out of their respective districts, for the purposes
of demanding the manifests aforesaid, and of examining and
searching the said ships or vessels; and the said officers respec-
tively shall have free access to the cabin, and every other part of
a ship or vessel 28
The act also established officers of the Revenue Cutter Service as
officers of the Customs, with appropriate enforcement authority
similar to that described above.29
In order to strengthen commerce, Congress also required vessels
to register in the United States before they could be used in fisher-
ies and waterborne trade among the states. 30 The Revenue Cutter
Service quickly proved an effective mechanism of the new govern-
ment. As a result of its enforcement of the customs laws, the na-
25. See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 445-46 (1827) (discussing the need
for regulation of foreign commerce in the pre-Constitution period as a factor in the estab-
lishment of the new government).
26. Act of July 4, 1789, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 24.
27. See KING, supra note 23, at 12-15. See generally James S. Carmichael, Comment, At
Sea with the Fourth Amendment, 32 U. MIAMI L. REv. 51 (1977) (detailing the development
of both statutory and case law empowering the Coast Guard to utilize searches and seizures
of vessels at sea pursuant to its law enforcement power).
28. Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 31, 1 Stat. at 164. A "league" is a measure of distance
generally equal to three statute miles. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 889 (6th ed. 1990). The
Revenue Cutter Service's authority therefore extended to 12 miles offshore, which is also the
extent of the current United States Territorial Sea. See Proclamation No. 5928, 3 C.F.R. §
547 (1989).
29. Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 64, 1 Stat. at 175.
30. See Act of Feb. 18, 1793, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 305, 305 ('An Act for enrolling and licensing
ships or vessels to be employed in the coasting trade and fisheries, and for regulating the
same."). The Revenue Cutter Service was given enforcement authority within this statute to
detect "any breach of the laws of the United States." Id. § 27, 1 Stat. at 315.
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tion's foreign debt was eliminated by 1796.31 In 1794, Congress
added to the duties of the Service the responsibility of enforcing
prohibitions against American involvement in the slave trade.2
The 1790 Act was superseded and repealed in 1799 by a new act"3
that left the enforcement authority of the Service essentially un-
changed.
34
As relationships with England deteriorated in advance of the
War of 1812, Congress enacted laws prohibiting trade with the
British Empire.3 5 The revenue cutters actively enforced these laws,
seizing several vessels that were of British registry or had British
cargo.38 After the war, Congress acted to protect and promote
American shipping by closing U.S. ports to British ships sailing
from ports in England or the British colonies.37 The revenue cut-
ters continued previous enforcement efforts under the new law38
Congress strengthened the American stance against the importa-
tion of slaves in 180039 and 1818,40 and the Revenue Cutter Service
31. HOWARD W. BLOOMFIELD, THE COMPACT HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
11 (1966).
32. See id. at 17; KING, supra note 23, at 118.
33. See Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 112, 1 Stat. 627, 704.
34. See id. §§ 97-102, 1 Stat. at 699-700; see also Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
187, 235-36 (1804) (discussing the 1799 Act in the context of the right of nations under
international law to enact trade regulations and enforce them by stopping and boarding
vessels). In Church, the court stated that
it never was contended, that it could only be exercised within the range of the
cannon from their [shore] batteries. Indeed, the right given to our own revenue
cutters, to visit vessels four leagues from our coast, is a declaration that, in the
opinion of the American government, no such principle as that contended for
has a real existence.
Id. The 1799 Act also authorized construction of up to 10 new cutters for the service. Ch. 22,
§ 97, 1 Stat. at 699. Other provisions of the Act allowed the President to assign the revenue
cutters to the Navy, id. § 98, 1 Stat. at 699-700 (repealed 1933), and provided for a distinct
ensign and pendant to mark revenue cutters. Id. § 102, 1 Stat. at 700.
35. See Act of Mar. 2, 1811, ch. 29, 2 Stat. 651; Act of May 1, 1810, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 605; Act
of June 28, 1809, ch. 9, 2 Stat. 550; Act of Mar. 1, 1809, ch. 24, 2 Stat. 528.
36. See The Ann, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 289 (1815) (involving a vessel seized for carrying
British cargo with the intent of importing it into the United States); The Fanny's Cargo, 13
U.S. (9 Cranch) 181 (1815) (involving a vessel seized for attempting to import cargo from
Great Britain); The Brig Penobscot v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 356 (1813) (involv-
ing a vessel seized for importing salt from Antigua into Savannah).
37. Act of Apr. 18, 1818, ch. 70, 3 Stat. 432 (repealed 1830),
38. See The Frances and Eliza, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 398 (1823).
39. Slave Trade Act, ch. 51, 2 Stat. 70 (1800).
40. Slave Trade Act, ch. 91, 3 Stat. 450 (1818).
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enforced these laws zealously 41 However, one seizure of a slave
vessel resulted in a judicially determined limit to the cutters' au-
thority to conduct searches and seizures. 42 In this case, a Spanish
vessel, the Antelope, was found with a cargo of slaves on the high
seas (further than twelve miles from shore) off the coast of the
United States and was seized for violation of the Slave Trade
Acts.43 The Supreme Court, noting that Spain had not outlawed
the slave trade, ruled that the visit and seizure of the Antelope was
illegal.44 The Court indicated that the seizure would have been up-
held if the vessel had entered United States waters and thereby
violated our law, but its language was not unequivocal:
If it be neither repugnant to the law of nations, nor piracy, it is
almost superfluous to say in this Court, that the right of bring-
ing in for adjudication in time of peace, even where the vessel
belongs to a nation which has prohibited the trade, cannot exist.
The Courts of no country execute the penal laws of another; and
the course of the American government on the subject of visita-
tion and search, would decide any case in which that right had
been exercised by an American cruiser, on the vessel of a foreign
nation, not violating our municipal laws, against the captors.45
The following year the Court decided a case involving under-
tones of piracy but only briefly addressed this uncertainty in the
scope of the revenue cutters' authority to stop and search vessels.4"
In that case, a U.S. vessel approached the Marianna Flora, a vessel
of Portuguese registry, which then fired on the American ship, mis-
taking it for a pirate ship.47 The Marianna Flora was seized and
brought into port for "piratical aggression" against the American
ship.48 The Court first emphasized that no unconditional right of
visitation or search existed to enable the enforcement of American
41. See The Slavers, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 350, 350 (1864) (involving a vessel seized by the
revenue cutter Harriet Lane because it was equipped and prepared for the purpose of slave
trading); The Merino, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 391, 393-94 (1824).
42. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
43. Id. at 68.
44. Id. at 122.
45. Id. at 122-23.
46. The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1 (1826).
47. Id. at 5-6.
48. Id. at 6.
1993] 941
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law 49 However, recognition of the right to "approach any vessels
descried at sea, for the purpose of ascertaining their real charac-
ters" has minimized this restriction.50 Ultimately, the Court ruled
that the seizure of the Marianna Flora was a lawful exercise of this
right.5
1
In 1866 Congress passed "[a]n Act further to prevent smuggling
and for other Purposes. 52 The Act did not repeal the 1799 Act,
53
but many of its sections supplemented or superseded the parallel
provisions in the earlier law. For example, the authority of customs
officers, including revenue cutter officers, was defined in terms sim-
ilar to the previous enactments. 4 Significantly, the new law omit-
ted one critical term. Previously, the authority to stop and board
for revenue enforcement had been expressly limited to ships within
the United States or "within four leagues of the coast thereof."55
The Act of 1866 omitted this geographic reference and expanded
the enforcement authority to cover "any breach or violation of the
laws of the United States."56 Officers were also authorized to arrest
persons who violated the law;57 previous sanctions had limited au-
thorized action to seizure and possible forfeiture of the vessel.
58
The Coast Guard received its present name in 1915 when the
Revenue Cutter Service was combined with the Life-Saving Service
to form a new agency 5e The new name had no effect on the law
49. Id. at 42 ("The party, in such case, seizes at his peril. If he establishes the forfeiture,
he is justified. If he fails, he must make full compensation in damages.").
50. Id. at 43.
51. Id. at 58.
52. Act of July 18, 1866, ch. 201, 14 Stat. 178 (repealed 1922). The primary purpose of the
statute was to update the antismuggling laws to account for new territories created during
this country's westward expansion. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3419 (1866).
53. Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 22, 1 Stat. 627.
54. Act of July 18, 1866, § 2, 14 Stat. at 178.
55. Act of Mar. 2, 1799, § 99, 1 Stat. at 700.
56. Act of July 18, 1866, § 2, 14 Stat. at 178. This was not an omission by oversight;
Congress believed that greater authority was required in order to police the frontiers and
control rampant smuggling. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3419, 3440-41 (1866). An
amendment to the bill that would have required suspicion of wrongdoing before stopping a
vessel was defeated in the House by a vote of 59 to 35. Id. at 3440-41, 3443.
57. Act of July 18, 1866, § 2, 14 Stat. at 178.
58. See Act of Mar. 2, 1799, § 70, 1 Stat. at 678; Act of Feb. 18, 1793, ch. 8, § 27, 1 Stat.
305, 315.
59. Act of Jan. 28, 1915, ch. 20, 38 Stat. 800. The Life-Saving Service was created by the
Act of June 18, 1878, ch. 265, 20 Stat. 163. The principal purpose of the 1915 statute was to
942 [Vol. 34:933
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enforcement power of the organization, as the Act expressly con-
tinued the applicability of preexisting statutes and directed that
"[a]ll duties now performed by the Revenue-Cutter Service and
Life-Saving Service shall continue to be performed by the Coast
Guard. ' 60 These duties would thrust the Coast Guard into the
center of a contentious "war" in very short order.
The Prohibition Era
The Eighteenth Amendment, ratified on January 16, 1919, l pro-
hibited "the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating li-
quors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation
thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the ju-
risdiction thereof for beverage purposes."62 The Amendment
granted Congress and the states authority to enforce its prohibi-
tion on alcohol by "appropriate legislation."6 3 Accordingly, Con-
gress enacted the National Prohibition Act 64 with a powerful en-
forcement mechanism.6 5 The effects of the amendment on the law
enforcement and criminal justice systems of the United States
were profound.6
bring the personnel of the Life-Saving Service under the pension system available to the
Revenue Cutter Service. See 52 CONG. REC. 1949-78 (1915). As a result of the merging of the
two services, in 1915 the Coast Guard consisted of 25 seagoing ships, 19 harbor tugs and
launches, 279 Coast Guard stations, and 4,093 active duty personnel. Id. at 1952.
60. Act of Jan. 28, 1915, § 2, 38 Stat. at 801.
61. U.S. CONsT. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
62. Id. § 1.
63. Id. § 2.
64. National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919) (repealed in part 1934).
65. Section 26 of title 2 of the Act provided:
When the commissioner, his assistants, inspectors, or any officer of the law
shall discover any person in the act of transporting in violation of the law,
intoxicating liquors in any wagon, buggy, automobile, water or air craft, or
other vehicle, it shall be his duty to seize any and all intoxicating liquors found
therein being transported contrary to law. Whenever intoxicating liquors trans-
ported or possessed illegally shall be seized by an officer he shall take posses-
sion of the vehicle and team or automobile, boat, air or water craft, or any
other conveyance, and shall arrest any person in charge thereof.
Id. § 26, 41 Stat. at 315.
66. As one judge noted, "[V]iolators apprehended run into the thousands in this district
alone, and there is every reason to believe that only a very small percentage of those who
violate the law are caught and charged." United States v. Ford, 3 F.2d 643, 643 (S.D. Cal.
1925). Furthermore, in the judge's words, "[I]t [was] not too much to say that the traffic in
illicit liquor [was] the nursery of crime of every description." Id. at 644; see Maul v. United
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Parallels to the current situation, which has resulted from the
illegal trade in drugs rather than alcohol, are striking and undenia-
ble. For example, the smuggling techniques then and now include
use of foreign "motherships, ' '67 bribery of enforcement officials,
and random violence.68 Furthermore, several Coast Guardsmen
were killed in the line of duty during Prohibition; 9 fortunately as
yet, no Coast Guardsman has lost his life in the drug war as a di-
rect result of a smuggler's actions, but the danger involved is com-
parable.7 0 Ultimately, the legalization of alcohol ended Prohibition.
Today, as victory in the war on drugs remains elusive despite in-
creased costs,7 1 the advocates of legalization or decriminalization of
drugs gain new members. Most importantly, the Prohibition cases
represented the first major judicial treatment of Fourth Amend-
ment search and seizure issues in the maritime setting and pro-
vided the basis for much of the reasoning of courts adjudicating
drug smuggling cases today 
7 1
Congress enacted another revenue statute in 1922 to regulate
foreign commerce, repealing the 1866 statute.73 The 1922 statute
was significant because Congress reintroduced the restriction on
boardings to within four leagues of the coast of the United States
7 4
and also provided procedural guidelines for procuring search war-
States, 274 U.S. 501, 526 n.30 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (stating in reference to Coast
Guard law enforcement efforts during Prohibition: "In 1919, the aggregate of vessels
boarded was 2,005; in 1922, 31,653; in 1925, 53,080. The number of vessels seized or reported
for violations of law increased from 601 in 1919 to 1,887 in 1925.").
67. See Edward H. Lueckenhoff, Note, Free Navigation: Examination of Recent Actions
of the United States Coast Guard, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 141, 141-42 (1980) (describing
the "mothership" technique); infra note 89 and accompanying text.
68. See generally HAROLD WATERS, SMUGGLERS OF SPIRITS: PROHIBITION AND THE COAST
GUARD PATROL (1971) (providing accounts of the "rum wars" from a Coast Guardsman who
served during Prohibition).
69. See BLOOMFIELD, supra note 31, at 149-50.
70. In August 1990, four Coast Guard aviators were killed when their E2C radar plane
crashed short of the runway at Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico on its return from a drug
smuggling surveillance mission. Coast Guard Plane Crash Kills 4 on Drug Patrol, MIAMI
HERALD, Aug. 25, 1990, at 5A.
71. See STEVEN WISOTSKY, BREAKING THE IMPASSE IN THE WAR ON DRUGS 1-3, 90-115
(1986).
72. See infra notes 76-133 and accompanying text.
73. Act of Sept. 21, 1922, ch. 356, 42 Stat. 858 (repealing Act of July 18, 1866, ch. 201, 14
Stat. 178).
74. Id. § 581, 42 Stat. at 979.
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rants when an enforcement officer suspected that merchandise for
which duties had not been paid was stored in a house, store, or
other building.75 The statute made no mention, however, of search
warrants for vessels. In light of these two sections, Congress clearly
did not require warrants for searches of vessels located within four
leagues of the coast. The subject of warrantless searches, as might
be expected, soon received much attention from the courts.
An early case, Carroll v. United States, 6 involved a stop and
search not of a ship, but of an automobile transporting alcoholic
beverages in violation of the National Prohibition Act.7 Chief Jus-
tice Taft, writing for the Court, held that Congress, in enacting the
National Prohibition Act, distinguished between searches of build-
ings or private dwellings and those of vehicles.7 8 A warrant would
be necessary to search a building or private dwelling, but not to
search a vehicle. ' 9 The Court derived this distinction from the Act
and the legislative history of an amendment to the Act that pro-
vided for sanctions against an officer who searched a private dwell-
ing without first obtaining a warrant.80 The Court then found that
such a distinction was consistent with the Fourth Amendment 8'
and was supported by the series of revenue and customs laws en-
acted since the formation of our constitutional government.
82
Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment we find in the first Congress, and in the following
Second and Fourth Congresses, a difference made as to the ne-
cessity for a search warrant between goods subject to forfeiture,
when concealed m a dwelling house or similar place, and like
goods m course of transportation and concealed in a movable
vessel where they readily could be put out of reach of a search
warrant.8
3
75. Id. § 595, 42 Stat. at 983.
76. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
77. Id. at 134.
78. Id. at 147.
79. Id. at 146-47.
80. Id. at 144-47.
81. Id. at 149.
82. Id. at 149-52.
83. Id. at 151.
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Among the early acts to which the Court referred for this justifica-
tion were the Acts of 1790 and 1799 establishing and defining the
authority of the Revenue Cutter Service. 4 In language that could
arguably apply with equal force to vessels, the Court discussed
when a warrantless search of a vehicle would be legal. The Court
acknowledged that "[i]t would be intolerable and unreasonable if
a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile on
the chance of finding liquor and thus subject all persons lawfully
using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a
search.""8 Ultimately, the majority held that probable cause was
required to justify a warrantless search of an automobile.86 In dis-
sent, Justice McReynolds agreed that the acts of the early Con-
gresses authorized search and seizure upon mere suspicion, but
contended that the National Prohibition Act did not confer such
authority 87
In United States v. Ford,8 8 the seizure of a Canadian vessel lo-
cated beyond the (three-mile) territorial sea of the United States
but within the four-league (twelve-mile) area for violation of the
National Prohibition Act presented the question of enforcement
against foreign vessels. The vessel was charged with using what
later became known as the "mothership" technique, whereby a
large vessel carries a quantity of contraband to a point off the
coast but outside territorial waters and transfers the contraband
cargo to several smaller "contact" boats for transfer to shore. 9
84. Id. at 151; see supra notes 23-34 and accompanying text (discussing the 1790 and
1799 Acts).
85. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153-54.
86. Id. at 158-59.
87. Id. at 166-67 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
88. 3 F.2d 643, 643 (S.D. Cal. 1925).
89. Id. The reasoning underlying this tactic is simple: by using a number of small, hard-
to-detect vessels for the final stage of the smuggling operation, the probability of most, if
not all, of the contraband's reaching its intended market is increased. The limited enforce-
ment resources could not interdict all of the contact boats, and the seizure of even half of
the cargo still left the smugglers with an overall profit from the venture. Because of the
enormous profit margins in illegal drugs, this technique was used extensively in the 1970s
and early 1980s, but Coast Guard enforcement efforts shifted to interdicting the mothership
far from the coast, and the technique is not used so widely today. See Coast Guard Budget,
Fiscal Year 1991: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Navigation of the
House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1990) (state-
ment of Admiral Paul A. Yost, Jr., Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard).
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In response to this practice by British "motherships," the
United States and Great Britain signed a treaty in which Britain
granted blanket authority to the United States to board British
vessels located at a distance off the coast that could be travelled by
the vessel m an hour's steaming.90 Naturally, legal disputes soon
arose over whether a vessel had been within the one-hour steaming
range when seized.9' Ford did not confront the court with such a
dispute, but presented the question whether the treaty with Eng-
land was necessary to allow seizure of the vessel in question.92
Without providing an exact answer to this question, the court
noted that "[o]ur own legislation authorizes revenue cutters to visit
vessels four leagues from the coast; and the acts of Congress on
this subject are a clear expression of the opinion of our government
that nothing in the law of nations prohibited them to confer such
power on its cruisers. '9 3 The court also found that the Act of 1799
was virtually identical to the British Hovering Act, which estab-
lished four leagues from the coast as the enforcement jurisdiction
of British customs statutes.9 4 "[B]oth of these statutes," the court
stated, "have been declared repeatedly to be consistent with the
law and usage of nations. ' 95 The court reasoned that "a general
search on the high seas is a very different thing from a reasonable
search at a reasonable distance from shore to prevent and punish
foreigners for a violation of our laws and assistance to our own citi-
zens in violating them"96 and held the search and seizure lawful.
97
The exact extent of Coast Guard enforcement authority soon be-
came the subject of disagreement among federal courts. A district
90. Ford, 3 F.2d at 644. An agreement entered into in 1981 between the United States
and Great Britain is currently in force to address drug smuggling. Agreement to Facilitate
the Interdiction of Vessels Suspected of Trafficking Drugs, Nov. 13, 1981, U.K.-U.S.,
T.I.A.S. No. 10296; see United States v. Biermann, 678 F Supp. 1437, 1441-42 (N.D. Cal.
1988), afl'd sub nom. United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 753 (1991); see also Stieb, supra note 14, at 140-41 (discussing the agreement).
91. See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 107-09 (1933) (dismissing charges ema-
nating from the seizure of a vessel 11.5 miles from shore because the ship could travel a
maximum of 10 miles per hour).
92. Ford, 3 F.2d at 644.
93. Id. at 646.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 648.
97. Id.
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court in Texas addressed the question in a case involving an Amer-
ican vessel that had been stopped 19.5 miles offshore and seized
after a cargo of assorted liquor was found aboard.9 8 The defend-
ants contended that the seizure was unlawful because it occurred
beyond the legal enforcement area.99 The court disagreed and pro-
nounced an expansive theory of Coast Guard authority:
That the officers of a revenue cutter have the authority to seize
and search a vessel within the territorial waters of the United
States, where there is probable cause to suspect it is smuggling,
or endeavoring to smuggle, goods into the United States, with-
out warrant, is too clearly settled since the foundation of this
government, both by statute and judicial decision, to admit of
argument here. . That this right is as strong and vigorous
outside of the territorial waters as inside those waters must also
stand to reason, for the waters of the high seas belong as much
to the United States as to any other nation, and the powers of
the United States may be as well exercised there as in her own
waters, subject only to diplomatic considerations.
100
A Massachusetts court in United States v. Bentley °1 reached a
different conclusion. In that case, a Coast Guard patrol seized a
motorboat laden with liquor at a point greater than twelve miles
offshore. 102 The defendants sought to suppress the use of the mo-
torboat or liquor as evidence.10 3 The court referred to the case of
The Underwriter,°4 and agreed that section 581 of the Tariff Act
of 1922105 limited the exercise of authority by Coast Guard officers
to the waters within four leagues of the coast of the United
States.10 6 In concluding its opinion allowing the motion to sup-
98. The Rosalie M., 4 F.2d 815, 816 (S.D. Tex. 1925), af'd, 12 F.2d 1970 (5th Cir. 1926).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 12 F.2d 466 (D. Mass. 1926).
102. Id. at 466-67. The crew of the motorboat initially attempted to bribe the Coast
Guard officers to permit the motorboat to retrieve illegal liquor from a nearby British
schooner and return to the United States; the Coast Guard officers refused the bribe and
seized the motorboat when it returned from the British vessel with the liquors. Id.
103. Id. at 467.
104. 6 F.2d 937 (D. Conn. 1925), rev'd, 13 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1926), aff'd sub nom. Maul v.
United States, 274 U.S. 501 (1927),
105. Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 581, 42 Stat. 851, 979.
106. Bentley, 12 F.2d at 467.
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press, the court summarized: "[M]y study has failed to reveal any
legislation conferring upon revenue officers or officers of the Coast
Guard authority to search and seize, except section 581 of the
Tariff Act , .,107
The decision of the district court in The Underwriter reached
the Supreme Court in 1927108 in a case that would later have reper-
cussions in the halls of Congress.10 9 The case arose from the seizure
of the tug Underwriter with 811 cases of whiskey aboard at a point
thirty-four miles from shore. 10 The district court held that
"[n]owhere is there any authority vested in the Coast Guard to
make a seizure beyond the 12-mile limit" and dismissed the ac-
tion.""' The Second Circuit reversed and reinstated the com-
plaint.1 12 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Van Devan-
ter, held the seizure lawful and affirmed the circuit court."13
The Supreme Court traced the development of the Coast
Guard's search and seizure authority and implicitly agreed with
the district court that section 581 of the Tariff Act of 1922 pro-
vided a limit to the area of exercise of the authority to board and
search.114 Tracing the enactment and repeal of the revenue en-
forcement statutes, the Court found that a provision of the Act of
March 2, 1799 was still effective." 5 This provision contained no
limiting language regarding the place of seizure.lIe Therefore, the
Court held that the seizure was legal if based upon violation of a
revenue law.1 7 Because the vessel had engaged in a trade for which
107. Id.
108. Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501 (1927), rev'g The Underwriter, 6 F.2d 937 (D.
Conn. 1925).
109. See infra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of the
1936 Act defining the jurisdiction of the Coast Guard).
110. The Underwriter, 6 F.2d at 937.
111. Id. at 940.
112. The Underwriter, 13 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1926), afl'd sub nom. Maul v. United States,
274 U.S. 501 (1927).
113. Maul, 274 U.S. at 512.
114. Id. at 504-07.
115. Id. at 504-05.
116. Id. at 505. This section provided: "It shall be the duty of the several officers of the
customs to seize and secure any vessel or merchandise which shall become liable to seizure
by virtue of any law respecting the revenue, as well without as within their respective dis-
tricts." Id. (quoting Revised Stat., tit. 34, ch. 10, § 3072 (1875) (original version with materi-
ally similar language at Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 70, 1 Stat. 627, 678 (repealed 1935)).
117. Id. at 507-08.
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she had no proper license, the requisite violation was present."'
The Court also reviewed the statutes and confirmed that Coast
Guard officers were "officers of the customs" and therefore were
authorized to make seizures for violations of the revenue acts."'
The logic of this opinion is somewhat troubling. The Act of 1799
on which the Court based its holding expressly restricted revenue
cutter officers' boarding authority to the area within twelve miles
of the coast.2 e Logically, the authority to board should be a pre-
requisite to the authority to seize. Arguably, Congress' failure to
repeal or expressly to supersede this statute was an oversight.'
2'
Finally, even though Congress may have power to provide search
and seizure authority on the high sea, a restrictive reading is justi-
fied because Congress placed specific geographic limits in previous
laws. 122 It is reasonable to expect that Congress would have exer-
cised its power explicitly
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brandeis criticized the reasoning
of the majority- "As I read the statutes, they do not confer express
authority, but the authority exists because it is to be implied as an
incident of the police duties of ocean patrol which Congress has
imposed upon the Coast Guard."'12 3 Brandeis believed a separate
opinion was necessary because the majority opinion could be inter-
preted as restricting the Coast Guard's authority 124 He then pro-
118. Id. at 508.
119. Id. at 509-10. In language very similar to that of the district court in The Rosalie M.,
4 F.2d 815, 816 (S.D. Tex. 1925), afl'd, 12 F.2d 1970 (5th Cir. 1926), the Court further
explained the basis of its holding:
If Congress were without power to provide for the seizure of such vessels on
the high sea, a restrictive construction might be justified. But there is no want
of power in this regard. The high sea is common to all nations and foreign to
none; and every nation having vessels there has power to regulate them and
also to seize them for a violation of its laws.
Maul, 274 U.S. at 511.
120. Ch. 22, § 99, 1 Stat. at 700.
121. A look at the long list of laws repealed upon enactment of 14 U.S.C. § 89 reveals the
possibility that one line item could have been unknowingly omitted. See Act of Aug. 4, 1949,
ch. 393, § 20, 63 Stat. 495, 561-65.
122. E.g., Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 581, 42 Stat. 851, 979; Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, §
31, 1 Stat. 145, 164.
123. Maul, 274 U.S. at 512 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 513. Brandeis reasoned:
If the statutes are construed as granting to the Coast Guard express authority
to make the seizure in question in order to protect the revenue, the authority
COAST GUARD AUTHORITY
vided a brief history of the Coast Guard to emphasize the point
that Congress and the Treasury had continually expanded the en-
forcement responsibility and authority of the service beyond the
revenue laws.12 His historical summary concluded with a policy
argument:
If the officers of revenue cutters were without authority to seize
American merchant vessels found violating our laws on the high
seas beyond the twelve-mile limit, or to seize such vessels found
there which are known theretofore to have violated our laws
without or within those limits, many offenses against our laws
might, to that extent, be committed with impunity. For clearly
no other arm of the Government possesses such authority.126
Once the Court had pierced the twelve-mile enforcement veil,
the stage was set, not only for the remainder of Prohibition, but
also for the drug war of today The expansion of enforcement au-
thority in Maul had immediate impact and remains significant to-
day An example of its immediate impact was the case of United
States v. Lee,127 decided the same day as Maul, which involved the
seizure of a motor boat located alongside a schooner twenty-four
miles offshore in an area known as "Rum Row. 12 s When a search-
light from the Coast Guard patrol boat shone on the motorboat,
officers could see several cans of liquor. 129 The First Circuit held
the visit and search and seizure illegal because they were con-
ducted more than twelve miles from the coast. 30 The Supreme
Court reversed, referring to its holding in Maul for Coast Guard
authority to seize a vessel beyond the twelve mile limit.' From
Maul, the Court was able to derive the Coast Guard's authority to
board and search a vessel when there was probable cause to believe
so granted is obviously very narrow, and the express grant may possibly be
read as exhausting the authority conferred beyond the twelve-mile limit; in
other words, as showing that no implied authority is conferred.
Id.
125. Id. at 514-17.
126. Id. at 520.
127. 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
128. Id. at 560.
129. Id. at 560-61.
130. Lee v. United States, 14 F.2d 400, 405 (1st Cir. 1926), rev'd, 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
131. Lee, 274 U.S. at 562.
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a violation of law was occurring.' 32 The Court stated that when
probable cause is present, "search and seizure of the vessel, and
arrest of the persons thereon, by the Coast Guard on the high seas
is lawful, as like search and seizure of an automobile, and arrest of
the persons therein, by prohibition officers on land is lawful.'
1 33
Fine-tuning the Statute
In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Maul, Congress
in 1936 enacted the substantive provisions of what would become
14 U.S.C. § 89.13 The statute did not expand the Coast Guard's
authority, but the Treasury Department desired passage of the bill
in order to define clearly the jurisdiction and authority of the
Coast Guard.'3 5 Final enactment and codification of Title 14 of the
United States Code, entitled "Coast Guard," was accomplished 159
years after the creation of the Coast Guard." 6 Congress avoided
any significant changes from the earlier law,"37 and the section has
132. Id.
133. Id. at 563.
134. Act of June 22, 1936, ch. 705, 49 Stat. 1820 (codified as amended at 14 U.S.C. § 89
(1988)); see H.R. REP. No. 2452, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1936) ("The occasion for this bill
arises out of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States on May 31, 1927, in the
cause of Maul v. United States.").
135. See 80 CONG. REC. 9165-66 (1936). In support of the bill, the Assistant General Coun-
sel of the Treasury Department explained:
The bill does not enlarge the present authority of the Coast Guard but merely
reaffirms the jurisdiction which it has been exercising for many years. Today it
is enforcing all of the laws which this bill would authorize it to enforce. Its
present authority is general, however, and this bill is necessary because of the
Supreme Court decision holding that the Coast Guard must have specific au-
thority to enforce the laws of the United States. The Coast Guard is our ocean
and border water police and patrol force. If that service is not empowered to
enforce the laws of the United States along our shores and in boundary waters,
those laws are unenforcible [sic], since there is no other agency of this Govern-
ment equipped to enforce them.
Id. at 9166 (letter from C.M. Hester, Assistant General Counsel, Treasury Dept., to Sen.
Copeland).
136. Act of Aug. 4, 1949, ch. 393, 63 Stat. 495, 502.
137. See 95 CONG. REC. 10,210 (1949) (statement of Sen. O'Conor) ("In our preparation of
the bill, it was our intention, and we carried it through, to make no substantive changes at
all in the law. Our every effort in conjunction with the House committee was merely to
revise and codify the preexisting law.").
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The repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment in 1933 ended the ille-
gal smuggling of alcohol aboard vessels, but the desire to make il-
licit, tax-free profits remained, and other forms of contraband soon
drew the smugglers' attention. Whereas the illegal substance dur-
ing Prohibition was alcohol, after Prohibition's repeal, the chief il-
legal substances became cocaine' 4° and marijuana.' 4'
The Coast Guard's emphasis on law enforcement changed dra-
matically after the end of Prohibition. The onset of World War II,
the postwar emergence of the United States as an economic power
with increased marine commerce, and the wars in Korea and Viet-
nam all forced the Coast Guard to focus on missions other than
law enforcement until well into the 1970s. 142 The emergence of ma-
rijuana as a popular drug in the late 1960s and early 1970s stimu-
lated importation of the drug from South America to satisfy
America's demand, necessitating large shipments of the contra-
band.1 43 The Coast Guard now had a new focus to an old mission.
These large loads of marijuana were easily detected once a board-
ing party was aboard a vessel,' 44 and the Coast Guard rapidly im-
138. See 14 U.S.C. § 89 (1988).
139. Act of Aug. 3, 1950, ch. 536, 64 Stat. 406 (deleting the word "To," which had pre-
ceded "examine" in the second sentence).
140. See, e.g., Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 202 (1964) (involving a defendant
who had smuggled 3.5 pounds of cocaine from South America aboard a commercial vessel in
1958), overruled by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
141. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
142. A history of the Coast Guard published in 1966 does not even discuss law enforce-
ment as a mission during this period. See BLOOMFIELD, supra note 31, at 273-86.
143. At the height of marijuana use in 1979, 22.5 million Americans were current users of
the drug. NATIONAL NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE CONSUMERS COMM., THE NNICC REPORT 1991,
at 43 (1992) [hereinafter NNICC REPORT]. Through 1985, the vast majority of marijuana
imported into the United States came from Colombia and other South American countries.
See Joel Brinkley, Drug Crops Are Up in Export Nations, State Dept. Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 15, 1985, at Al.
144. See United States v. Dillon, 701 F.2d 6, 6 (1st Cir. 1983); United States v. Watson,
678 F.2d 765, 766 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982); United States v. Robbins,
623 F.2d 418, 419 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Erwin, 602 F.2d 1183, 1184 (5th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1071 (1980).
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plemented an aggressive boarding strategy to stem the flow of the
drug into the country 145
The transition was not entirely painless, however. It took time
for Coast Guard boarding officers to become adept in identifying
the substances involved and understanding the full extent of their
authority under 14 U.S.C. § 89.146 Nonetheless, the Coast Guard
soon established a reputation for successful law enforcement, due
in large part to the deference the judiciary accorded the Coast
Guard in drug cases. The Supreme Court tacitly endorsed this def-
erence to the Coast Guard,147 even though it simultaneously re-
stricted the enforcement procedures of land-based officers.
48
Before Prouse: Early Skirmishes in the Drug War
One of the first modern drug-smuggling cases involved an Ameri-
can sailing vessel that the Coast Guard boarded and seized on the
high seas in the Yucatan Channel 4 9 after sighting it running at
night without lights. 50 In an action for forfeiture of the vessel, the
district court held that the stopping and boarding of the vessel was
lawful under 14 U.S.C. § 89; it was also lawful based upon the
Coast Guard's reasonable suspicion of illegal activity because the
vessel was running at night without lights.'
51
Because marijuana has a relatively distinct odor, a large quantity of marijuana was often
detected from downwind of the suspect vessel before the boarding. See United States v.
Mena, 863 F.2d 1522, 1526 (1ith Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 834 (1989); United States v.
Padilla-Martinez, 762 F.2d 942, 946 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 952 (1985); United
States v. Wray, 748 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir. 1984); United States v. Glen-Archila, 677 F.2d 809,
812 (lith Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 874 (1982).
145. See OPERATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT Div., U.S. COAST GUARD, DIGEST OF LAW EN-
FORCEMENT STATISTICS 1 (1991) [hereinafter LAW ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS].
146. See United States v. Odom, 526 F.2d 339, 341 (5th Cir. 1976) (involving a boarding
officer who repeatedly had to request instructions when he was confronted with a marijuana
cargo in the hold of a fishing vessel).
147. See infra note 291 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's treat-
ment of 14 U.S.C. § 89).
148. See infra notes 208-16, 333 and accompanying text.
149. The Yucatan Channel is located between Cuba and Mexico. See Odom, 526 F.2d at
340.
150. United States v. One (1) 43 Foot Sailing Vessel Winds Will, 405 F Supp. 879, 881
(S.D. Fla. 1975), afl'd, 538 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1976). During the boarding and inspection for
safety violations, officers discovered over a ton of marijuana. Id.
151. Id. at 883.
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The court justified the constitutionality of the boarding on sev-
eral grounds. First, the court reasoned that because the defendant
was a United States vessel, it was an extension of the territory of
the United States, and therefore jurisdiction extended to it and
gave government officials the right to board and inspect it. 152 Sec-
ond, the court found that the character of maritime law and the
law of nations imposed an obligation on each country to exercise
effective control and jurisdiction over all vessels flying its flag.
153
Finally, the court reasoned that section 89 granted the authority to
the Coast Guard to board and inspect-powers the Coast Guard
had possessed since its inception1 54 and which courts had upheld
repeatedly 155 The court also analogized the government's interest
"in the safety and administrative control of vessels operating
under the protection of its flag and authority of its documents
to the traditionally high government interest in liquor or firearms
dealers which have historically justified administrative measures
such as limited warrantless inspections or searches. '156 This anal-
ogy is clearly applicable in the case of commercial vessels from
which revenues are derived, but is strained when used in connec-
tion with recreational vessels.
In United States v. Brignon-Ponce,157 a case that could have
rendered Delaware v. Prouse151 unnecessary, 59 the Supreme Court
considered the legality of a stop of an automobile near the Mexi-
can border by agents of the Border Patrol.160 The asserted justifi-
cation for the stop was the apparent Mexican origin of the vehi-
cle's occupants.'61 The government contended that the stop was
legal based upon a provision of the Immigration and Nationality
Act.162 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, recited the maxim
152. Id. at 881-82.
153. Id. at 882.
154. Id. (citing Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, 1 Stat. 145).
155. Id. (citing Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501 (1927)).
156. Id. at 883.
157. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
158. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
159. See infra notes 208-16 and accompanying text (discussing Prouse).
160. Brignont-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 874-75.
161. Id. at 875.
162. Id. at 877. The government argued that the Immigration and Nationality Act author-
ized "agents, without a warrant, 'within a reasonable distance from any external boundary
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that "no Act of Congress can authorize a violation of the Constitu-
tion"163 and then discussed the Court's previous holdings in Terry
v. Ohio'1 and similar cases involving investigatory stops.6 5 The
Court ruled that the reasonable suspicion requirement of Terry ap-
plied to this stop' 6 and held that because the standard was not
met, the stop was unconstitutional.167 The holding was narrow, ap-
plicable only to enforcement of a particular law regarding illegal
aliens. 16 8 The more general question of random vehicle stops re-
mained unclear until Prouse.
In United States v. Odom,'169 a circuit court first discussed 14
U.S.C. § 89 in the context of a drug seizure. In Odom, the Coast
Guard boarded the American registered vessel Mar-J-May on the
high seas without any prior indication of violations of United
States law 170 While checking for the vessel's identification number,
the boarding officer discovered marijuana bales in the vessel's
hold.' The district court upheld the boarding and search under
border search standards because the vessel had been headed to-
of the United States, to board and search for aliens any vessel within the territorial waters
of the United States and any railway car, aircraft, conveyance, or vehicle.' "Id. (quoting the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3)).
163. Id. (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973)).
164. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
165. Brignonb-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878.
166. Id. at 881.
167. Id. at 884.
168. Id. The Court explained:
The effect of our decision is to limit exercise of the authority granted by [the
Immigration and Nationality Act]. Except at the border and its functional
equivalents, officers on roving patrol may stop vehicles only if they are aware
of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts,
that reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be
illegally in the country.
Id.
169. 526 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1976).
170. Id. at 341. Officers boarded the ship in order to conduct a routine safety and docu-
mentation inspection. Id.
171. Id. A large percentage of maritime seizures of contraband have resulted from a plain
view or plain smell discovery occurring while a boarding officer was looking for a vessel's
documentation number. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 678 F.2d 765, 766 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982); United States v. Demanett, 629 F.2d 862, 865 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 910 (1981); United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1086 (5th
Cir. 1980) (en banc).
The increased smuggling of contraband within concealed compartments, as well as among
and within commercial cargo carried, has reduced the frequency of these "easy" detections.
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ward the United States. 172 Holding that the boarding and "admin-
istrative inspection" of the vessel were permissible under the au-
thority of section 89, the Fifth Circuit did not reach the border
issue. 73 The court determined that the further search, which veri-
fied that the substance in the hold was marijuana, was justified by
the probable cause that arose during the lawful inspection.14 The
court did not, however, explore the constitutionality of the statute.
The "administrative inspection" justification for the Fifth Cir-
cuit's holding in Odom was undermined by the Supreme Court in
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.;7 5 however, Marshall involved the
owner of an electrical and plumbing shop who denied agents of the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) permis-
sion to conduct a safety compliance inspection of his facilities
without a warrant. 76 After reviewing the government's contentions
that warrantless searches were necessary, 7 7 the Court restated
the reasons underlying the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment:
The authority to make warrantless searches devolves almost un-
bridled discretion upon executive and administrative officers,
particularly those in the field, as to when to search and whom to
search. A warrant, by contrast, would provide assurances from a
neutral officer that the inspection is reasonable under the Con-
stitution, is authorized by statute, and is pursuant to an admin-
istrative plan containing specific neutral criteria. 78
The Court ruled that the government interest did not justify a
warrantless search.17  This holding, however, was not extended to
administrative and safety inspections of vessels at sea. 80
See, e.g., NNICC REPORT, supra note 143, at 9 (discussing various methods cocaine traffick-
ers have employed to conceal shipments of the drug on seagoing vessels).
172. Odom, 526 F.2d at 341-42.
173. Id. at 342.
174. Id.
175. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
176. Id. at 310. The owner claimed that a warrantless search would violate his Fourth
Amendment right against illegal search and seizure. Id.
177. Id. at 311.
178. Id. at 323.
179. Id. at 324.
180. Id. (holding narrowly that warrantless inspections are not constitutional under
OSHA).
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The Fifth Circuit again examined the constitutionality of Coast
Guard actions under 14 U.S.C. § 89 in United States v. Warren.""l
A full panel in Warren reversed a three-judge panel's previous rul-
ing that a Coast Guard boarding and search of an American vessel
beyond the twelve-mile limit was unconstitutional. 18 In their
search, boarding officers found only small quantities of drugs, the
possession of which was not illegal on the high seas. 183 The board-
ing party questioned the crew regarding the purpose of the trip
and the lack of certain equipment; the answers aroused suspicion
that the vessel was smuggling. 4 One crewman admitted that a
large quantity of money was aboard and led the boarding party to
where the money was stored.8 5 Basing their action on an admis-
sion that this money had not been declared, the officers arrested
the crew for violation of currency laws.8 6 A subsequent search of
the vessel revealed equipment for baling marijuana and other evi-
dence of drug distribution.
8 7
A three-judge panel of the circuit court held that the warrantless
search of the vessel violated the Constitution because the Coast
Guard boarding officers "extend[ed] for no reason a search for
safety purposes beyond that which [was] reasonably needed to de-
termine if the safety and documentary regulations [had] been fol-
lowed."'88 Sitting en banc, the court held that Odom controlled'"
181. 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), modified en banc, 612 F.2d 887 (5th Cir.),
cert. dented, 446 U.S. 956 (1980), overruled by United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593
(5th Cir.), cert. dented, 488 U.S. 924 (1988).
182. Id. at 1061.
183. Id. at 1062 n.2. At present, possession of any quantity of a controlled substance
aboard a U.S. vessel is illegal. See infra note 348 and accompanying text (discussing Zero
Tolerance enforcement).
184. Warren, 578 F.2d at 1062. Although the defendant said the boat was chartered for
fishing and diving, the boarding party noted the absence of the necessary equipment. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1063. During the subsequent inventory search, the Coast Guard found a trash
compactor, plastic bags, a letter from the Colombian consulate, a list of equipment to be
used to load and package marijuana, a list of Colombian contacts, and the defendant's pass-
port indicating a visit to Colombia two weeks earlier. Id.
188. United States v. Warren, 550 F.2d 219, 225 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd en banc, 578 F.2d
1058 (5th Cir. 1978), modified en banc, 612 F.2d 887 (5th Cir.), cert. dented, 446 U.S. 956
(1980), overruled by United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593 (5th Cir.), cert. dented, 488
U.S. 924 (1988).
189. Warren, 578 F.2d at 1066.
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and found that Coast Guard authority under subsection 89(a) "is
plenary when exercised beyond the twelve-mile limit; it need not
be founded on any particularized suspicion."'190 The defendants,
however, claimed that a customs regulation required probable
cause to justify boarding an American vessel on the high seas.191
The court admitted that a reading of subsection 89(b) 19 2 in isola-
tion would lead to a probable cause requirement. 9 3 In light of the
language of subsection 89(c),19 4 however, the court found that the
customs regulation imposed no restriction on the authority of
Coast Guard officers. The court stated, "[W]e think it clear that by
enacting section 89(c), Congress intended to give the Coast Guard
the broadest authority available under law Subsection c of
section 89 interdicts any regulations that might impinge upon that
authority ,,195
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Fay, a member of the three-judge
panel that heard the case originally, attacked virtually every find-
ing and conclusion of the en banc opinion. 9" His opening comment
set the tone: "It is my belief that the constitutional rights of Amer-
ican citizens have been dealt a severe blow by today's en banc
opinion, and I am somewhat stunned by the cursory treatment this
opinion gives to ,certain serious constitutional and factual is-
190. Id. at 1064-65.
191. Id. at 1067. The defendants invoked 19 C.F.R. § 162.3(a)(2) (1977). Warren, 578 F.2d
at 1067. A subsequent amendment to this section deleted the probable cause requirement.
See 19 C.F.R. § 162.3 (1992).
192. Subsection 89(b) of 14 U.S.C. provides:
The officers of the Coast Guard insofar as they are engaged, pursuant to the
authority contained in this section, in enforcing any law of the United States
shall:
(1) be deemed to be acting as agents of the particular executive de-
partment or independent establishment charged with the administration
of the particular law; and
(2) be subject to all the rules and regulations promulgated by such
department or independent establishment with respect to the enforce-
ment of that law.
14 U.S.C. § 89(b) (1988).
193. Warren, 578 F.2d at 1067-68.
194. "The provisions of this section are in addition to any powers conferred by law upon
such officers, and not in limitation of any powers conferred by law upon such officers, or any
other officers of the United States." 14 U.S.C. § 89(c).
195. Warren, 578 F.2d at 1068, 1070.
196. Id. at 1079-92 (Fay, J., dissenting).
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sues."'197 Although the Coast Guard's authority to stop and board
an American vessel on the high seas for the purpose of conducting
a safety or documentation inspection was not at issue,' 8 Judge Fay
argued that the constitution limited these legal stops to the scope
necessary to conduct a valid inspection.'99 According to Judge Fay,
the Customs and DEA agents accompanying the Coast Guard
boarding team had conducted an inquiry and search that was to-
tally independent of, and unrelated to, the safety and documenta-
tion inspection.' °° Because indications that a crime was being com-
mitted resulted from this unlawful inspection, no independent
probable cause existed for searching the vessel or arresting the
crew 201 Therefore, the Coast Guard's actions were illegal and evi-
dence subsequently obtained was inadmissible.0 2
Judge Fay argued that the majority opinion granted the Coast
Guard "unfettered discretion to seize American vessels on the high
seas." 20 Comparing the case to the Supreme Court's opinion in
Unted States v. Brignon-Ponce,°4 he asserted that restrictions
imposed on border stops for detection of illegal aliens should be
applied to Coast Guard stops for safety inspections. 205 His dissent
also discussed constitutional restrictions on street stops and
searches of persons for investigatory purposes and asserted that
197. Id. at 1079.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1080. Judge Fay explained: "The moment the Coast Guard absent probable
cause enlarges the scope of its inquiry beyond that of a safety and documentary inspection,
the seizure is no longer constitutional, and all evidence derived from inquiries as a result of
the expanded intrusion is unconstitutionally obtained and inadmissible at trial." Id.
200. Id. at 1084.
201. Id. at 1084-85.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1080.
204. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
205. Warren, 578 F.2d at 1081 (Fay, J., dissenting). Judge Fay stated:
The Supreme Court was unwilling to grant a roving border patrol unfettered
discretion to seize vehicles, but, for some reason left unexplained by the major-
ity opinion, our Court implies that a grant of similar discretion to a Coast
Guard officer on a patrol thousands of miles away from the United States
would be constitutional. Perhaps the majority feels that there are greater exi-
gencies involved in a confrontation between the Coast Guard and an American
vessel on the high seas than are present in a confrontation between a trav-
eler and a Border Patrol officer near the Mexican border. If so, I disagree.
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those cases presented greater exigent circumstances than could be
found in a Coast Guard stop without probable cause.2"' According
to Judge Fay, this fact justified at least equivalent restrictions on
Coast Guard stops.
20
The Reasonable Suspicion Standard
Delaware v. Prouse s08 arose from a random stop of an automo-
bile that occurred only because a patrolman "saw the car in the
area and wasn't answering any complaints, so [he] decided to pull
them off."2 09 The police officer asserted that the purpose of the
stop was to check the license of the driver and the vehicle registra-
tion.21 0 Justice White, writing for the majority, first emphasized
that a vehicle stop was a seizure for constitutional purposes and
was therefore subject to the applicable standard of reasonable-
ness.21' In determining whether a law enforcement action met this
standard, the Court used a balancing test that weighed the individ-
ual's Fourth Amendment privacy interests against legitimate gov-
ernmental interests furthered by the practice.212 The Court then
referred to its earlier decision in Brignoni-Ponce and found that
the stop in question was at least as intrusive of Fourth Amend-
ment rights as the stop in that case:
We cannot assume that the physical and psychological intrusion
visited upon the occupants of a vehicle by a random stop to
check documents is of any less moment than that occasioned by
a stop by border agents on roving patrol .... Both interfere
206. Id. at 1082.
207. While the need to inspect for safety and documentation reasons is legitimate,
it is no more compelling than the need of a roving patrol to control the influx
of aliens. Nor can it be argued that the problem of preventing drug importa-
tions is any greater on the high seas than it is at the Mexican border. It is
impossible to rationalize under the Fourth Amendment a seizure of an Ameri-
can vessel for an indeterminate amount of time in order to inquire about possi-
ble drug violations.
Id. at 1083.
208. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
209. Id. at 650-51.
210. Id. at 650.
211. Id. at 653-54.
212. Id.
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with freedom of movement, are inconvenient, and consume time.
Both may create substantial anxiety.
2 13
After reviewing the State's interests in making discretionary
stops for safety, registration checks of vehicles, and license checks
of drivers, the Court found that the balance favored individuals'
Fourth Amendment interests.214 The Court also pointed to the
"standardless and unconstrained discretion" of the law enforce-
ment officer in the field as a great threat to Fourth Amendment
values.2 15 In order to counter that threat, the Court held that
except in those situations in which there is at least articulable
and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an
automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an oc-
cupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stop-
ping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check
his driver's license and the registration of the automobile are
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.216
The Court's logic would seem to apply equally well to random
stops of vessels for documentation and safety checks. In reality,
however, the impact of Prouse on maritime interdiction was no-
ticeable in only one circuit.
After Prouse: The Standard Is Diluted by Seawater
The decision in United States v. Piner1 7 caused considerable
concern among Coast Guard officials.218 The defendants moved to
suppress over two tons of marijuana seized during a random safety
inspection stop and boarding of a sailboat at night in San Fran-
213. Id. at 657.
214. Id. at 661. The court reasoned: "The marginal contribution to roadway safety possi-
bly resulting from a system of spot checks cannot justify subjecting every occupant of every
vehicle on the roads to a seizure-limited in magnitude compared to other intrusions but
nonetheless constitutionally cognizable-at the unbridled discretion of law enforcement offi-
cials." Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 663.
217. 608 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1979).
218. See id. at 361. The Coast Guard argued that random stops and boarding authority
without probable cause or suspicion was the "only practicable means" of ensuring compli-
ance with safety regulations. Id.
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cisco Bay 219 In its review of the district court's order granting de-
fendants' motion,220 The Ninth Circuit first examined the govern-
ment's need to board recreational vessels while underway to ensure
compliance with safety and equipment requirements and conceded
that the governmental interest "outweighs the intrusion on privacy
encountered in the ordinary boarding."22' The court then looked at
the law enforcement stop as a "subjective intrusion" that results in
a "particularly unsettling effect upon the ordinary person. "222
Comparing Piner to Prouse, the court reasoned:
If the stop of an automobile upon a public highway by an identi-
fiable police car is felt to create such subjective intrusion as to
require the use of potentially less intrusive alternatives, surely
the stop of an isolated boat after dark, followed by a physical
intrusion upon the boat itself, would have an unsettling effect
immeasurably greater, placing a far greater demand upon the
government to come forward with balancing factors.
223
Given that a less intrusive means of enforcing the safety require-
ments was available by use of daytime boardings, the stop and
boarding at night "must be for cause, requiring at least a reasona-
ble and articulable suspicion of noncompliance, or must be con-
ducted under administrative standards so drafted that the decision
to search is not left to the sole discretion of the Coast Guard of-
ficer. '224 Applying this standard, the court affirmed the district
court's order suppressing the marijuana.
2 5
Piner is also interesting because it provides insight into the posi-
tion of a current Supreme Court Justice on the scope of Coast
Guard authority under 14 U.S.C. § 89. Then-Judge Anthony Ken-
nedy dissented in Piner by first distinguishing Prouse, then look-
ing to the history and prior interpretation of section 89.226 This
219. Id. at 359. The boarding officer observed the bags of marijuana in plain view just
after stepping aboard the vessel. Id.
220. United States v. Piner, 452 F Supp. 1335, 1340-41 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd, 608 F.2d
358 (9th Cir. 1979).





226. Id. at 361-63 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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case differed from Prouse, Judge Kennedy believed, because statis-
tics showed that random Coast Guard boardings had greater en-
forcement effectiveness than random automobile stops.227 Further-
more, the less intrusive alternatives that the Court had advocated
in Prouse, such as "annual inspections and road block-type stops,"
were not suitable for vessels.2 8 Judge Kennedy considered the ma-
jority's daytime boarding requirement a "novel theory [that] ig-
nores the fact that safety violations at night may be more danger-
ous than those during the day 229
Judge Kennedy further argued that the long history of congres-
sional and judicial approval of Coast Guard authority to stop and
board American vessels without a warrant was "persuasive author-
ity for the reasonableness of such boardings," which the majority
had not refuted. 30 Moreover, a history of government regulation in
this area allowed these stops and boardings to fit within the ad-
ministrative inspection exception to the warrant requirement.231
Finally, because the stop was legitimate and contraband was in
plain view almost immediately after the officer boarded the vessel,
the search implicated no privacy interest.2 32 The reasoning of
Judge Kennedy's dissent has been validated by the overwhelming
majority of other circuits233 and by the Supreme Court.2 4
The Supreme Court's ruling in Prouse precipitated another en
banc hearing of the Fifth Circuit to reconsider a previous ruling in
a drug smuggling case. 5 Unlike in United States v. Warren,236 the
227. Id. at 362.
228. Id.
229. Id. It was also critical in this case that the boat was underway, thus justifying a
greater intrusion. Id. "Searches at night may be more intrusive because they raise the spec-
ter of uniformed officers rousing people from their sleep. But where the boat is underway, it
is clear that someone is, or ought to be, awake." Id.
230. Id. at 364.
231. Id., see supra text accompanying note 173. But see supra text accompanying notes
175-79 (discussing limitations to the administrative inspection exception).
232. Piner, 608 F.2d at 364 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Kennedy explained: "I do not be-
lieve that by merely stepping onto the exposed decks of the boat the Coast Guard officer
invaded an area in which the defendants had a legitimate expectation of privacy." Id.
233. See, e.g., infra notes 255, 266-68, 276, 285-86 and accompanying text.
234. See infra notes 300-02 and accompanying text.
235. United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
236. 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), modified en banc, 612 F.2d 887 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980), overruled by United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988).
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full court in United States v. Williams did not reverse the earlier
ruling, but reviewed the case to correct improper Fourth Amend-
ment analysis by the panel and provide clear precedent within the
circuit.23 7 The court applied the Prouse reasonable suspicion re-
quirement, but not to United States vessels.238
Williams arose from the boarding and search and seizure of a
Panamanian vessel on the high seas.239 The Panamanian govern-
ment granted consent for the boarding and search and seizure.24°
Although the consent of Panama made the boarding legitimate, the
court discussed Coast Guard authority under 14 U.S.C. § 89 in or-
der to clarify the law within the circuit.
241
First, the court observed that section 89 provided the sole statu-
tory authority for the stop of a foreign vessel on the high seas.242
The court held that the statutory authority was "not limited on its
face to American flag vessels," as U.S. jurisdiction included any
offense that had an effect within the United States.243 Therefore, a
conspiracy to smuggle illegal goods into the U.S. aboard a foreign
vessel on the high seas would subject that vessel to U.S. jurisdic-
tion and, consequently, Coast Guard boarding.244 Before boarding
a foreign vessel outside U.S. territorial waters, however, the court
required the Coast Guard to have at least a reasonable suspicion
that the vessel was subject to American law.245 In Williams, the
prior sighting of the vessel, combined with events occurring shortly
after the Coast Guard contacted the vessel by radio, provided the
237. Williams, 617 F.2d at 1069.
238. Id. at 1073-90.
239. Id. at 1070-71.
240. Id. A Drug Enforcement Administration surveillance plane had sighted the vessel
five days before the Coast Guard cutter intercepted it on the high seas. Id. When the air-
craft sighted it, the vessel was anchored 1.5 miles off the coast of Colombia with several
small vessels around it. Id. The Coast Guard boarding party found over 10 tons of mari-
juana on the vessel. Id., see also Lueckenhoff, supra note 67, at 154-56 (discussing
Williams).
241. Williams, 617 F.2d at 1071-72.
242. Id. at 1075.
243. Id. at 1076.
244. Id.
245. Id., see also United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 176 (3d Cir. 1986) (adopt-
ing a reasonable suspicion standard for high seas boardings); United States v. Green, 671
F.2d 46, 53 (1st Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1135 (1982).
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necessary suspicion.24 The court also validated the authority to
stop under section 89 by referring to the history of the statute,24
the difference in the necessity of stops of land vehicles and water
vessels,248 and similar authority granted by international law.249
Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit subjected the search of the vessel
to greater scrutiny because it recognized that there are areas of a
vessel in which a person could have a reasonable expectation of
privacy 250 However, the court noted that a privacy interest could
not exist in the hold where the vessel's identification number was
displayed. 51 Therefore, the defendant suffered no violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights when the boarding party entered the
hold to verify the documentation number and discovered the mari-
juana; the seizure was constitutional.252
The Fourth Circuit declined to apply the reasonable suspicion
standard in a case involving a seizure of twenty-five tons of man-
246. Williams, 617 F.2d at 1077. A DEA officer had previously observed the vessel en-
gaged in activity that suggested the loading of contraband. Id. Moreover, despite the dis-
tress flag flown by the vessel, coupled with the numerous attempts by the crew members to
summon the Coast Guard, the captain rejected Coast Guard assistance. Id.
247. Id. at 1079-81.
248. Id. at 1081.
249. Id. at 1082-84.
250. Id. at 1086.
251. The court reasoned:
Because section 89(a) and article 22, section 2, constitutionally authorize the
Coast Guard to enter the hold of a vessel to verify the vessel's identity in the
complete absence of suspicion of criminal activity or of the presence of contra-
band, it follows that no one, not even a person with a proprietary interest in
the vessel and in the cargo, could conceivably have any legitimate expectation
of privacy with regard to any objects that would be in the plain view (or smell)
of a person conducting such an identification check.
Id.
252. Id. But see 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 10.5(k), at 783-84 (2d ed.
1987), stating:
This unnecessary departure from the probable cause requirement in Williams
is unsound. Motor vehicles are also subject to "extensive" regulation, but
this has not led to the conclusion that the privacy expectation in such convey-
ances is so low that they may be searched on "reasonable suspicion." Certainly
the expectation of privacy in a vessel is not lower than the expectation vis-a-vis
a car; if anything, it is the other way around. As for the law enforcement inter-
est, it is to be doubted that the enforcement problems at sea so significantly
exceed those at our land borders as to justify a special Fourth Amendment
rule.
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juana from an American fishing vessel during a coordinated opera-
tion in which the Coast Guard boarded every U.S. vessel less than
250 feet in length.25 3 The court held that the boarding of the vessel
was constitutional as a border stop and that the reasonableness of
the particular action should be evaluated by the standards of the
statute that granted the authority for the action. 54
The Fourth Circuit cited Warren for the rule that Coast Guard
authority to board vessels on the high seas under 14 U.S.C. § 89 is
plenary, 255 and then gave four reasons why this suspicionless
boarding was reasonable.256 First, the court found that the board-
ing was not made at the "will and whim of the officer in the
field, ' 257 but was part of a multiagency operation in an area known
to be travelled by drug smugglers headed for the United States.258
The fact that all vessels of a particular type were boarded in a
systematic manner was also important.259 Second, the boarding in-
volved only a "minimal and reasonably necessary intrusion on
privacy interests, ' 260 a conclusion bolstered by the closely regu-
lated industry exception to the warrant requirement. 26' The excep-
253. United States v. Harper, 617 F.2d 35 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 887 (1980).
The case also involved an interesting jurisdictional note. Although the seizure of the vessel
occurred in the Mona Pass, between the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico, the Fourth
Circuit had appellate jurisdiction from the District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina because the law enforcement action was terminated in a controlled delivery of the
marijuana in North Carolina in an effort to apprehend the shoreside conspirators. Id. at 36-
37; see also United States v. Coats, 611 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1979) (involving the same incident
as in Harper, but denying a shoreside conspirator standing to contest the Coast Guard's at-
sea boarding and search of the vessel), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909 (1980).
254. Harper, 617 F.2d at 37.
255. Id. at 38 (citing United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1064 (5th Cir. 1978) (en
banc), modified en banc, 612 F.2d 887 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980), over-
ruled by United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 924
(1988)).
256. Id. at 38-39.
257. Id. at 38.
258. Id.
259. Id. The court also saw no reason to prevent boardings at sea in light of the fact that
they are routinely done in port without particularized suspicion. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. The Supreme Court has displayed a willingness to tolerate warrantless inspec-
tions of commercial enterprises that are engaged in businesses licensed and closely regulated
and monitored by the federal government. See, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311,
314-15 (1972) (involving a search of a gun dealer who was subject to strict federal licensing
and reporting regulations); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 75
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tion came into play in the stops because of the closely regulated
nature of the fishing industry 26 12 Third, law enforcement involving
the stopping and boarding of vessels at sea required "special con-
siderations. '263 For example, because of the inherent mobility of a
vessel, a requirement of reasonable suspicion before boarding a
vessel in a blanket boarding operation "would encourage outright
flaunting of the navigation, safety and administrative laws of the
United States at the expense of our government's sovereign obliga-
tion under international law to police its flag ships. 26 4 Fourth, the
court analogized these systematic vessel stops to "roadside truck
weigh-stations and inspection points" that the Supreme Court has
held constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.265
The First Circuit, in United States v. Hilton,266 held that suspi-
cionless stopping and boarding of American vessels on the high
seas was constitutional if limited to "the necessary task of con-
ducting safety and document inspections. '267 After placing this
limit on the Coast Guard's authority, however, the court stated
that such stops constitute an exception to the warrant require-
ment.28 The court considered the rule of Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc. 26 9 that administrative agencies might require warrants to con-
duct safety inspections27 but held that the boardings were "more
analogous to the exception recognized for industries 'long subject
(1970) (involving a search of a business engaged in the manufacture and sale of liquor, an
industry heavily regulated and taxed by the government). "Businessmen engaged in such
federally licensed and regulated enterprises accept the burdens as well as the benefits of
their trade The businessman in a regulated industry in effect consents to the restric-
tions placed upon him." Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 271 (1973).
262. Harper, 617 F.2d at 38.
263. Id. at 39.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. 619 F.2d 127 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 887 (1980).
267. Id. at 131.
268. Id. at 132. The court reasoned that the exception was necessary
[b]ecause of the unique circumstances existing on the high seas, the long his-
tory of regulatory stops and inspections of ocean-going vessels, the heavy over-
lay of maritime and international law, the concern of the nation for policing its
ocean borders, even beyond the 12-mile customs zone, and the strong interest
in regulating the conduct of vessels protected by our flag.
Id.
269. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
270. See supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
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to close supervision and inspection.' ,,271 Therefore, the warrant re-
quirement of Marshall did not apply 272 Finally, the court dis-
cussed the reasonable suspicion requirement of Delaware v.
Prouse27 3 and found that the differences between automobile and
vessel stops and the lack of less intrusive alternatives available for
sea vessels made the rule of Prouse unworkable at sea. 4
The Third Circuit joined the debate in a case involving the
seizure of over ten tons of marijuana from a U.S. fishing vessel in
the territorial waters of the United States .2 75 The court held the
stop of the vessel constitutional as a necessary part of the "federal
documentation scheme. '276 However, the court did not broadly au-
thorize all Coast Guard boarding practices, limiting its holding to
the facts of the case. The court was cautious in its discussion of
the reasonable suspicion standard of Prouse27 s but found that the
standard was satisfied in this case, whether it was required or
not.279 Thus, it concluded that in light of the reasonable suspicion
271. Hilton, 619 F.2d at 132 (quoting Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397
U.S. 72, 77 (1970)).
272. Id.
273. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
274. Hilton, 619 F.2d at 133. ("While the Coast Guard is thus left with considerable dis-
cretion in deciding which vessels to stop, we believe such discretion is virtually unavoidable
in a scheme of regulation that depends on stops conducted at sea, far from courts and
magistrates.").
275. United States v. Demanett, 629 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 910
(1981). The contraband was discovered when a tarpaulin covering the hold was removed to
permit an inspection of the main-beam number to verify the documentation of the vessel.
Id. at 865.
276. Id. at 866-67. The court also concluded that because of the documentation laws and
their applicability to fishing vessels, there could be no expectation "that a warrant would be
required before such a boarding could take place." Id. at 867.
277. Id. The court was very specific:
We have no occasion to consider whether section 89(a) is a valid authorization
for warrantless boarding for other purposes, such as safety inspections and cus-
toms enforcement. Moreover, we hold that the statute is valid only insofar as it
involves the limited invasion of expectations of privacy on a vessel which are
necessary for documentation and main beam number examination.
Id.
278. Id. at 868. The court responded to the government's argument that the articuable
and reasonable suspicion standard should not apply at sea: "But certainly there are alterna-
tives other than unbridled discretion," Id.
279. Id. The court also limited this holding: "Since, for a documentation inspection, the
seizure satisfied the articulable and reasonable suspicion standard, we have no occasion to
address what circumstances would justify a more intrusive safety inspection." Id.
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for the boarding and the plain view discovery of the contraband,
no constitutional violations had occurred."'
The seizure of a Panamanian freighter on the high seas with a
cargo of marijuana presented the Second Circuit with the usual
questions regarding the scope of Coast Guard authority to stop a
foreign vessel and the propriety of its methods of effecting the
stop.2"' In spite of permission from Panamanian officials for a
Coast Guard boarding, the vessel refused to stop until the Coast
Guard cutter fired warning shots.2 82 After the stop, the boarding
party inspected the cargo hold of the ship and found "hundreds of
bales of marijuana. '28 3 In upholding the stop and boarding, the
court first rejected the government's contention that the history of
Coast Guard boarding statutes demonstrated that the Fourth
Amendment did not apply at sea.2 84 According to the court, the
stop at issue was investigatory and the principles of Terry v. Ohio
applied. 85 The court found reasonable suspicion to believe that
the vessel was engaged in illegal activity and that the stop and
boarding did not amount to "an unreasonably intrusive means of
investigating further. ' 286 The court also found the firing of warning
shots reasonable as "the least drastic way to force the ship to
stop.
28 7
280. Id. at 869.
281. United States v. Streifel, 665 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1981). A patrol aircraft sighted the
vessel loitering approximately 50 miles off the coast of Cape Cod. Id. at 416. The vessel then
began to move, and the Coast Guard diverted a cutter to investigate and sought permission
from the Panamanian government to board the vessel. Id. at 417. By the time permission
was received and the boarding took place, the vessel had proceeded to a point approxi-
mately 200 miles offshore. Id. at 418.
282. Id. at 417-18. Warning shots consist of live ammunition fired from the deck gun of
the Coast Guard cutter into the water in front of the vessel to be stopped. Id. at 424.
283. Id. at 418.
284. Id. at 419 n.8 (reviewing statutes since 1789).
285. Id. at 419-23. The court concluded "that any land-sea difference in governmental
need or in intrusiveness affects only how the principles are applied, not their applicability."
Id. at 423.
286. Id. at 424.
287. Id. The court did not discuss the statutory authority of the Coast Guard to use
warning shots or disabling fire. However, § 637(a) of 14 U.S.C. provides:
Whenever any vessel liable to seizure or examination does not stop on being
ordered to do so or on being pursued by an authorized vessel or authorized
aircraft , the person in command or in charge of the authorized vessel or
authorized aircraft may, after a gun has been fired by the authorized vessel or
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In dissent, Judge Oakes argued against extending Terry beyond
its facts, preferring a "regulatory" approach to the Fourth Amend-
ment."s He interprefed 14 U.S.C. § 89(b) as requiring that the
government promulgate specific regulations covering Coast Guard
activities such as those in the instant case.28 9 Because the stop here
was without a warrant or probable cause and the required regula-
tions did not exist, Judge Oakes viewed the stop and search as
unconstitutional.2 90
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the constitu-
tionality of section 89 directly,29 1 it validated the statute by refer-
ence in United States v. Villamonte-Marquez.9 2 In Villamonte-
authorized aircraft as a warning signal, fire at or into the vessel which does not
stop.
14 U.S.C. § 637(a) (1988). Other subsections provide immunity to persons who order warning
or disabling fire and define authorized vessels and aircraft. See id. § 637(a)-(b). Disabling
fire has been used to stop suspected smuggling vessels on 15 different occasions. See LAW
ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS, supra note 145, at 24-25.
288. 'Streifel, 665 F.2d at 425-26 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
289. Id. at 426-27.
290. Id. at 427.
291. The only Supreme Court references to the modern statute have been by way of illus-
trating the jurisdiction of the United States on the high seas, or by analogy to another
statute. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1235-36 (1991) (citing 14 U.S.C.
§ 89(a)'s authorization of Coast Guard searches and seizures upon the high seas, as an exam-
ple of Congress' intent to legislate the "extraterritorial application of a statute"); Argentine
Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440 n.7 (1989) (recognizing 14
U.S.C. § 89(a) as an example of Congress' desire and ability "to place the high seas within
the jurisdictional reach of a statute"); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579,
580 n.1 (1983) (comparing 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) to 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a), which empowers customs
officers to stop and board any vessel in order to examine its manifest and other
documentation).
However, Chief Justice Burger tacitly endorsed the statute in a concurring opinion in
Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637, 638-39 (1983) (per curiam) (Burger, C.J., concurring). Flor-
ida's enforcement statute required probable cause or consent for a state marine patrol of-
ficer to go aboard a private vessel. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 327.56 (West 1975 & Supp. 1992). Chief
Justice Burger advocated changing the law to parallel 14 U.S.C. § 89 more closely:
But when state courts interpret state law to require more than the Federal
Constitution requires, the citizens of the state must be aware that they have
the power to amend state law to ensure rational law enforcement. The people
of Florida have now done so with respect to Art. I, § 12, of the State Constitu-
tion; they have it within their power to do so with respect to Fla. Stat. § 327.56
(1981).
Casal, 462 U.S. at 639. The people of Florida have not, however, adopted the suggestion.
292. 462 U.S. 579, 580 n.1 (1983). Beyond the citation of 14 U.S.C. § 89 in the footnote,
the case was significant because Coast Guard personnel are also deemed officers of the Cus-
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Marquez, the Court examined a boarding by Customs agents to
inspect the documentation of a foreign vessel anchored within ter-
ritorial waters of the United States.9 3 Prior to boarding, the agents
had no suspicion of wrongdoing, but after going aboard the vessel,
a Customs officer detected the odor of marijuana and observed
through an open hatch what appeared to be bales of marijuana.294
A search of the vessel after the arrest of the occupants revealed
5,800 pounds of marijuana, and the defendants were subsequently
convicted of possession and importation of marijuana.295 The Fifth
Circuit, however, reversed the convictions because, under Wil-
liams, the officers did not have a reasonable suspicion of illegal ac-
tivity prior to boarding the foreign vessel.2 96
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit in an opinion by
Justice Rehnquist. 9 7 After tracing the history of Customs statutes
and the Court's decisions in this area, Rehnquist admitted that the
stop in question would be unconstitutional under the standard an-
nounced in Brignont-Ponce.2°s However, he viewed the differences
between automobiles and vessels as constitutionally significant,
therefore justifying a different analysis .29 9 The Court noted that
the possibility of checkpoints or roadblocks, which factored signifi-
cantly in the automobile cases, was not reasonably available on the
water.300 Moreover, it pointed out that the extensive regulation of
vessel documentation was much more complex than vehicle licens-
ing laws and served several valid governmental interests;30' unlike
vehicle licensing, in which an officer could observe evidence of
compliance without stopping the vehicle, ensuring compliance with
toms under 14 U.S.C. § 143 (1988). See supra note 22. Therefore, a judicial construction of
Customs authority is also a statement of Coast Guard authority in situations in which Cus-
toms statutes apply-generally, within the territorial sea and customs waters.
293. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 580-81. The vessel was anchored 18 miles from the
Gulf of Mexico in a waterway connecting the Gulf to Lake Charles, Louisiana. Id. at 582.
294. Id. at 581-83.
295. Id. at 583.
296. Id. at 583-84; see supra notes 242-51 and accompanying text.
297. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 584.
298. Id. at 584-88; see supra notes 160-68 and accompanying text.
299. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 588.
300. Id. at 589.
301. Id. at 589-91.
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documentation law required boarding the vessel."0 2 To support the
reasonableness of the Customs boarding, the Court found that
"[w]hile the need to make document checks is great, the resultant
intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests is quite limited.
303
Justice Brennan dissented, arguing that either a suspicion stan-
dard or a "discretion-limiting feature such as fixed check-
points instead of roving patrols" was required by the Court's
precedents. 04 He disagreed with the majority on three grounds.
First, he feared the " 'standardless and unconstrained discre-
tion' ,,30" of enforcement officers that the majority rule would allow,
and he argued that the Court's precedents in the area consistently
had required limits to that discretion.0 6 Second, he did not agree
that law enforcement problems m the maritime setting justified
the majority's standard.0 He also argued that reasonable alterna-
tives, similar to vehicle markings, were available for vessels, thus
eliminating the requirement to stop and board.30 8 Finally, Justice
Brennan presented a policy objection: "It simply does not follow
that, because the police in particular situations dislike limitations
placed on their powers of search and seizure, we may therefore
sanction an unprecedented invasion of constitutionally protected
liberties." 30 9
Soon after Villamonte-Marquez, the Ninth Circuit had occasion
in United States v. Humphrey1 ' to examine 14 U.S.C. § 89 in the
302. Id. at 591. Justice Rehnquist reasoned: "Requests to check certificates of inspection
play an obvious role in ensuring safety on American waterways. While inspection of a ves-
sel's documents might not always conclusively establish compliance with United States ship-
ping laws, more often than not it will." Id.
303. Id. at 592 (footnote omitted).
304. Id. at 598-99 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648
(1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Ortiz, 422
U.S. 891 (1975); United States v. Brignom-Ponce, 422 U.S 873 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973)).
305. Id. at 601 (quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661).
306. Id. at 601-07.
307. Id. at 607-09. "Checkpoints aside, there is no apparent reason why random stops are
really necessary for adequate law enforcement." Id. at 608.
308. Id. at 609.
309. Id., see also 4 LAFAvE, supra note 252, § 10.8(0, at 99 (agreeing with the dissent in
Villamonte-Marquez).
310. 759 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1987). A Coast Guard cutter
sighted the Orca, a 39-foot sailboat, over 700 miles from the nearest landfall in the Aleutian
Islands, and over 2,000 miles from the continental United States. Id. at 745. After boarding
1993]
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context of a daytime boarding and seizure of a U.S. vessel on the
high seas. The court cited Villamonte-Marquez as authority for
finding the boarding constitutional31' and affirmed the convictions
of the defendants for conspiracy and possession,312 favoring the
governmental interests involved over the minimal invasion of pri-
vacy 313 The principal governmental interests were promotion of
safety at sea and enforcement of documentation laws required
under international law 314 The interest in safety was relevant, said
the court, "because of the course and location of the Orca in the
North Pacific." 315 The court, however, stressed that its holding was
"highly fact specific [and did not] establish a general rule that ap-
proves all warrantless, suspicionless, and discretionary boardings of
noncommercial vessels on the high seas. ' ' 316 Even this limiting lan-
guage was soon cast aside, however.
3 1 7
The Current Situation. A Steady Course
In the latter half of the 1980s and thus far in the 1990s, the
circuit courts have followed their precedents in determining the
lawfulness of Coast Guard actions under 14 U.S.C. § 89. The most
recent circuit court opinion construing the validity of section 89
reflects both the settled nature of the law in this area and the sub-
stitution of cocaine as the drug of choice for maritime smugglers.
the vessel, and while looking for the marine sanitation device (a vessel's sewage holding
tank), the boarding officer discovered approximately fifty foil packages containing what was
later determined to be 3,100 pounds of marijuana. Id.
311. Id. at 746.
312. Id. at 751.
313. Id. at 746-47.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 747. The court also ruled that
[t]he Magistrate's finding that the commander of the Boutwell decided to
board the Orca to determine whether the sailboat was capable of making the
journey home is supported by the testimony of the commander of the BoutwelU
that he would have been remiss in his duty to insure the safety of United




317. "[W]e have held that an administrative plan limiting officer discretion is no longer
needed to validate a document and safety inspection by the Coast Guard. Our decision
in Piner has been substantially eroded following the U.S. Supreme Court decision in United
States v. Villamonte-Marquez." United States v. Troise, 796 F.2d 310, 312 (9th Cir. 1986).
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In United States v. Thompson, 18 a Coast Guard boarding party
seized an American registered forty-one-foot cabin cruiser-trawler
after a suspicionless stop and boarding in the Windward Pas-
sage,319 approximately five hundred miles from the United
States. 20 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed denial of the defendant's
motion to suppress the cocaine,3 21 holding that the defendant had
no reasonable expectation of privacy in a concealed compart-
ment.22 The court determined that generally the expectation of
privacy at sea is lower than on land and that the decreased expec-
tation extends to any area of the vessel where a safety and docu-
mentation inspection would reasonably take a Coast Guardsman.32 3
The court then found that inspection of the area before holes were
drilled into the concealed compartment provided probable cause to
believe a violation of law was occurring, thus justifying the intru-
sive search of the concealed compartment.324
Thompson indicates that the debate over the constitutionality of
the initial stop under section 89 is largely over. Present courts fo-
cus solely on the actions of the boarding party after the stop has
occurred. Additionally, the balance between government interest
and individual privacy in recent cases clearly rests on the premise
318. 928 F.2d 1060 (lth Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 270 (1991).
319. Id. at 1061. "The district court took judicial notice that the Windward Passage is the
most common route taken by drug smugglers in the Western Hemisphere." Id. at 1061 n.2.
320. Id. at 1061-63. During the safety inspection of the vessel, the boarding party noticed
several areas of new fiberglassing, parts of walls that did not match the surrounding area,
and unaccounted-for space. Id. at 1062. The owner of the vessel had recently purchased it
and claimed ignorance of the concealed compartment or its contents. Id. The boarding party
then drilled a small hole in the compartment and inserted a fiber optic scope to examine the
interior visually. Id. When this method proved unsuccessful because a white object blocked
the view, they drilled a larger hole so that a hand could be inserted into the compartment.
Id. This search revealed bricks of cocaine, and a subsequent search produced a total of 412
kilograms of the substance. Id.
321. Id. at 1066.
322. Id. at 1064.
323. Id. at 1064-65. As justification, the court stated: "One reason for this lower expecta-
tion of privacy at sea is that the Coast Guard is statutorily authorized to board a United
States vessel and conduct a documents and safety inspection pursuant to 14 U.S.C. § 89(a)."
Id. at 1064; see also United States v. Meadows, 839 F.2d 1489, 1491 n.2 (11th Cir. 1988)
("Indeed, the authority to board and conduct such an inspection is so absolute that it can
scarcely be argued that one has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of
a ship that would be plainly visible during such an inspection.").
324. Thompson, 928 F.2d at 1066.
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that there is no general expectation of privacy in a vessel sufficient
to prevent suspicionless stops. Otherwise, the analysis would be
circular; an expectation of privacy could not prevent random stops
by the Coast Guard because the statute empowering the Coast
Guard to conduct such stops is predicated upon an absence of a
legitimate expectation of privacy
QUESTIONING BROAD ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY AT SEA
The development of the Coast Guard's enforcement power and
the focus of that power have evolved, like the development of
many government agencies, in response to perceived-or ac-
tual-crises. From the founding of the Coast Guard as a tool to
help pay the new nation's debt, 25 through the embargo of British
goods in the early-nineteenth century326 and Prohibition in this
century, 27 to the present "war" against illegal substances, 2 s each
successive crisis has resulted in increased Coast Guard authority
Notably, the greatest expansion of power resulted from the adop-
tion of 14 U.S.C. § 89 after Prohibition had ended. That legislation
has remained virtually unaltered into the period of drug
interdiction.
In the last twenty years, Congress has enacted laws to facilitate
strong drug enforcement and has even recruited the military into
the effort.3 29 Such initiatives however, have not required any
change in the Coast Guard's underlying enforcement authority
The judiciary's endorsement of the statute's broad language has
allowed for full utility of the law
At first glance, the full extent of the Coast Guard's authority to
stop and board vessels on any federal waterway at any time for any
reason is surprising. This surprise is heightened by the realization
that this authority is unique to the Coast Guard; land-based law
enforcement officers have operated under a reasonable suspicion
325. See supra text accompanying notes 23-28.
326. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
327. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 67-72.
329. See Christopher A. Abel, Note, Not Fit for Sea Duty: The Posse Comitatus Act, the
United States Navy and Federal Law Enforcement at Sea, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 445
(1990).
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standard for fifteen years of the drug war.33 ° The struggle to keep
drugs from our streets and homes has fostered a judicial tolerance
for the exercise of Coast Guard authority that hardly qualifies as
Fourth Amendment analysis. 31 Indeed, the trend in court cases
analyzing Coast Guard boardings demonstrates that deference has
increased over time. 2  This trend stands in stark contrast to the
increase in restrictions upon land-based enforcement methods in
this century.
333
American society continues to favor fighting drug smuggling and
drug use in America. 4 The Coast Guard has a major impact on
maritime smuggling,335 but gauging its success is virtually impossi-
ble; statistics indicate the quantity of drugs interdicted but do not
measure how much gets through the net.336 It is clear that smug-
glers will respond to every advance in interdiction efforts or tech-
nology with new techniques to elude detection.33  The supply of
illicit drugs continues to be very high,33 8 as indicated by the low
330. See supra text accompanying notes 208-16.
331. Interview with Professor Paul Marcus, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of
William and Mary (Dec. 4, 1991). Professor Marcus explained that federal judges generally
view drug interdiction at sea as another area of the law not really subject to strict Fourth
Amendment analysis. Id. The nature of the setting in a vessel stop, border concerns, and the
drug smuggling problem in general contribute to a very limited application of the Fourth
Amendment. Id., see also 4 LAFAvE, supra note 252, § 10.8(f) (comparing Prouse with Vil-
lamonte-Marquez).
332. See supra notes 253-303 and accompanying text.
333. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 ( 1979) (holding that the stop of an auto-
mobile must be based on reasonable and articulable suspicion); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968) (holding that investigatory stops must be justified by reasonable suspicion).
334. See, e.g., Richard Lacayo, A Threat to Freedom?, TIME, Sept. 18, 1989, at 28, 28.
[T]here are indications that Americans are in a mood to fight drugs, even if
that means sacrificing some constitutional guarantees. In a Washington Post-
ABC News poll last week, 62% of those questioned said they would be willing
to give up "a few of the freedoms we have in this country" to reduce illegal
drug use significantly.
Id.
335. See supra note 6.
336. But see United States v. May May, 470 F Supp. 384, 387 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (stating
that the best intelligence estimates for 1978 were that only 10% to 15% of the marijuana
coming into the United States was interdicted by the Coast Guard).
337. See FBI devises drug test, DAILY PRESS (Newport News), Oct. 25, 1991, at C5; Feds
seize 11 tons of cocaine in fence posts in Fla. business, DAILY PRESS (Newport News), Dec.
3, 1991, at A3.
338. U.S. agency reports more coca leaf, opium, DAILY PRESS (Newport News), Mar. 1,
1992, at A3.
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retail prices in many areas a.33  The domestic production of mari-
juana appears to have increased sufficiently to balance the de-
creased importation as source countries switched to coca produc-
tion.340  Arguably, questioning the war may no longer be
frivolous . 4 1
Support for legalization or decriminalization of drugs has in-
creased.342 The primary impetus for this movement is the violence
that accompanies the drug trade in American cities, but another
factor is a belief that the government's approach to the national
hysteria has trampled certain freedoms, 43 one of them being the
freedom to enjoy a day on the water without the interruption of a
Coast Guard boarding.
3 44
Coast Guard officials acknowledge that members of the boating
public are generally law abiding and cooperate in Coast Guard en-
forcement efforts.3 45 However, as the methods of enforcement be-
339. See NNICC REPORT, supra note 143, at 6.
340. Id. at 3, 44; see also 1991 Budget Hearings, supra note 11, at 479, 497 (testimony of
Admiral Paul A. Yost, Jr., Commandant, U.S. Coast Gurard) (documenting the increase in
Coast Guard cocaine seizures and the decrease in marijuana seizures from foreign vessels
from 1983-1989); Ralph A. Weisheit, The Intangible Rewards from Crime: The Case of Do-
mestic Marijuana Cultivation, 37 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 506 (1991) (discussing the incen-
tives and rewards of domestic production of marijuana).
341. See generally Mark Gibney, Policing the World: The Long Reach of U.S. Law and
the Short Arm of the Constitution, 6 CONN. J. INT'L L. 103 (1990) (criticizing the increased
militarization of drug enforcement and the use of unconstitutional tactics in fighting the
drug war abroad); Sandi R. Murphy, Drug Diplomacy and the Supply-Side Strategy: A
Survey of United States Practice, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1259 (1990) (questioning the effective-
ness of U.S. efforts to curb the supply of drugs through intervention in drug-producing
countries); Stieb, supra note 14 (asserting that expanding the extraterritorial jurisdiction of
U.S. courts with regard to drug traffickers at sea violates international law).
342. See, e.g., Steven Wisotsky, Exposing the War on Cocaine: The Futility and Destruc-
tiveness of Prohibition, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 1305 (arguing that the war on cocaine can never
succeed).
343. "The real victim [in the drug war] is going to be the constitutional rights of the
majority of citizens." Lacayo, supra note 334, at 28 (quoting Harvey Gittler, Executive Di-
rector of Ohio's ACLU); see also supra notes 196-207 and accompanying text (summarizing
the dissent in Warren).
344. See Barry Vrevich, Comment, Treating a Vessel Like a Home for Purposes of Con-
ducting a Search, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 751 (1984) (arguing that when a vessel is being used
as a home, Fourth Amendment search and seizure requirements should apply).
345. See Recreational Boat User Fees: Hearing on H.R. 534 and H.R. 388 Before the
Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and




come more intrusive, public acceptance decreases. As more law-
abiding boaters have voyages interrupted for increasingly long pe-
riods or have holes drilled into their vessels in a search for con-
cealed drugs, the balance between endorsement of drug enforce-
ment and individual rights tilts more toward a feeling of outrage.
3 46
Among the recreational boating community, the desire for change
is growing strong.
3 41
Support has also developed for a change in Coast Guard law en-
forcement procedures used in the drug war. In 1988, the Customs
Service and Coast Guard implemented the President's "Zero Tol-
erance" program, which was designed to decrease demand for
drugs by targeting enforcement efforts at drug users; the initial im-
plementation of "Zero Tolerance" authorized the seizure of any
vessel on which a detectable amount of illegal drugs was found.
3 48
Numerous vessels were seized with minute amounts of marijuana
or cocaine, prompting commercial vessel owners-primarily com-
mercial fishermen-to complain that innocent owners and
crewmembers were being penalized and deprived of a living be-
cause of the indiscretion of one member of a nine- or ten-man
crew. 49 In response, Congress investigated the matters" and the
346. See Recreational Boating Safety: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard
and Navigation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 114-18 (1989) (statement of Michael Sciulla, Vice President, Boat Owners Association
of the United States) (describing four instances of "abuse" of law enforcement authority by
Coast Guard or Customs officers that occurred during searches of vessels for drugs that
ultimately found nothing).
347. See, e.g., "Zero Tolerance" Drug Policy and Confiscation of Property: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Comm. on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 83, 93 (1988) (statement of Antonio J. Califa,
Legislative Counsel, ACLU) [hereinafter Zero Tolerance Hearings]; Ben Brown, Murky
Waters for Boaters, USA TODAY, Aug. 16, 1990, at 12C; Arthur S. Hayes, Searches for Drugs
Roil Boaters, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 1990, at BI; Dave Knickerbocker, Who Wants the Vote
of Boaters?, NEWSDAY, Sept. 15, 1988, at 168.
348. See Zero Tolerance Hearings, supra note 347, at 98-100, 116-18.
349. See, e.g., Jon Nordheimer, Tighter Federal Drug Dragnet Yields Cars, Boats and
Protests, N.Y. TiMEs, May 22, 1988, at 1, 16 (describing, among other instances, how Coast
Guard and customs officials seized a shrimp boat and sold off its haul of shrimp worth
almost $6,000 after finding three grams of marijuana seeds and stems aboard the boat).
350. See Zero Tolerance Hearings, supra note 347.
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Coast Guard subsequently changed its procedures.3 51 At present,
personal-use amounts of illegal drugs found aboard commercial
vessels will result in a summons to appear in court and possible
administrative action against the owner at a later date, but no in-
terruption of the vessel's work.3 52  This compromise facilitates ef-
fective enforcement of the law and allows for a fairer assessment of
penalties against the wrongdoer. This change in policy to accom-
modate law enforcement and individual rights begs the question
whether a similar compromise could address the current Coast
Guard policy regarding random, suspicionless boardings35 3 The ar-
gument for change must be placed in context, however. The perva-
sive regulation of the commercial maritime industry, particularly
commercial fishing vessels, logically requires sea boardings to en-
sure compliance with catch limits, equipment restrictions, area clo-
sures, and other laws and regulations that cannot effectively be en-
forced at the dock.3 54 The need for investigation of recreational
boaters is not so compelling.
355
Boardings at sea are designed to enforce laws requiring docu-
mentation and safety equipment; courts have held that the inva-
sion of privacy in these boardings is limited and sufficiently bal-
anced by the government interest in enforcement.3 5 The scope of
regulation of recreational vessels,5 7 however, may require Coast
351. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6079, 102 Stat. 4181, 4325;
33 C.F.R. § 1.07-100 (1992); see also Nomination Hearing, supra note 10, at 16 (describing
revised enforcement policy).
352. 33 C.F.R. § 1.07-100.
353. In what can only be described as an accident of the concept of sovereignty applied,
foreign vessels cannot be stopped or boarded by the Coast Guard without reasonable suspi-
cion of a violation of U.S. law, but U.S. vessels get less constitutional protection as they are
liable to be boarded with no basis for suspicion. See supra notes 245, 252-317 and accompa-
nying text.
354. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. §§ 600-695 (1991) (fishery conservation and management reg-
ulations).
355. See Howard S. Marks, The Fourth Amendment: Rusting on the High Seas?, 34
MERCER L. REV. 1537 (1983) (arguing that vessel boardings for safety and documentation
inspections are often merely a pretext to searches for evidence of drug trafficking and that
the Fourth Amendment should apply); Note, High on the Seas: Drug Smuggling, the
Fourth Amendment, and Warrantless Searches at Sea, 93 HARv. L. REV. 725 (1980) (advo-
cating regular and mandatory dockside safety inspections rather than boardings at sea, and
arguing for judicial enforcement of the Fourth Amendment for any searches).
356. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
357. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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Guard personnel to examine virtually the entire vessel. Even the
restroom must be checked to ensure that raw sewage is not
dumped into the sea.358 The storage of life jackets and other safety
equipment in cabinets under bunks often requires a visit to sleep-
ing areas. 35 1 Most significantly, the search for the main-beam, or
documentation, number of the vessel may encompass every area of
the vessel to which a person can physically gain access. 3 0 A com-
parable "inspection" of a home would require a search warrant
under all but the most extreme circumstances. 361 Courts have rec-
ognized that there are areas aboard even commercial ships where a
reasonable expectation of privacy exists;362 thus, it is difficult to
imagine any area of a recreational vessel where similar expecta-
tions do not exist.
3 63
The government argues that investigations conducted while the
vessel is underway more effectively ensuie that required equip-
ment is aboard the vessel while in use.364 The necessity for such
intrusive enforcement, however, is further suspect 3 6 5 considering
the role of the Coast Guard Auxiliary 366 Courtesy Marine Exami-
nation program. The program enforces these same regulations at
358. See 33 C.F.R. § 159.7 (1992).
359. See id. §§ 175.11-.21 (requiring life preservers to be easily accessible and properly
maintained).
360. See supra note 171.
361. See generally Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (discussing at length the
origins of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures and
the necessity of the proper execution of search warrants).
362. United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1086 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) ("We are
assuming that there may be areas in the holds of vessels where someone could have a legiti-
mate privacy interest.").
363. See 3 LAFAvE, supra note 252, § 10.5(k), at 783-84.
364, See, e.g., United States v. Piner, 608 F.2d 358, 359-61 (9th Cir. 1979). The persua-
siveness of this argument is reduced by the Coast Guard's practice of inspecting large com-
mercial vessels while docked. For example, dockside inspections are implemented on com-
mercial'fishing vessels of all sizes as a means of enforcing statutes requiring increased safety
and survival equipment aboard these vessels. 46 U.S.C. §§ 4501-4508 (1988). At-sea boarding
of these vessels may still be necessary to verify compliance with many fishery regulations,
but if dockside boardings would be sufficient to inspect all required equipment, then officers
will no longer need to conduct equipment inspections during at-sea boardings unless they
observe an obvious violation.
365. See United States v. Demanett, 629 F.2d 862, 868 (3d Cir. 1980) ("[C]ertainly there
are alternatives other than unbridled discretion."), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 910 (1981).
366. The Auxiliary is a volunteer civilian organization of approximately 34,000 boat and
aircraft owners who assist the Coast Guard in several operational areas, from search and
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the dock in a low-key, cordial atmosphere, with no penalties other
than a stern admonition of a boater found to lack certain equip-
ment.367 If the vessel is in compliance, an inspection sticker is is-
sued to the owner, to be displayed in a prominent place on the
vessel.38 Effectively, this sticker on a recreational vessel institutes
a reasonable suspicion requirement for an underway boarding by a
Coast Guard patrol by way of an unwritten, but well-known inter-
nal policy to encourage voluntary compliance and cooperation with
the Auxiliary
Because the Auxiliary inspection process effectively accom-
plishes the mission of safety at sea, arguably this technique could
be adopted for all recreational vessels. Unfortunately, this mission
would be removed from the Auxiliary, as the organization cannot
implement it for all recreational boaters.369
Implementation of a dockside inspection program would mirror
the vehicle inspection programs in many states, in which the vehi-
cle is subject to an annual compliance inspection and issued a
sticker indicating compliance. The motorist then is free from such
inspections for a year and will not be stopped, for instance, to ver-
ify that his brakes function properly As a result, enforcement re-
sources need not be spent stopping numerous cars to find one or
two that are not in compliance. Implementing such a system for
recreational vessel boardings would free Coast Guard patrols to
concentrate on detecting and boarding vessels for which observa-
tion provides reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity Obvious vi-
rescue patrols, to communication monitoring and recreational vessel inspection. Overview,
supra note 7, at 10; see also 14 U.S.C. §§ 821-823; 33 C.F.R. §§ 5.01-.69 (1992).
367. Coast Guard policy states:
Courtesy Marine Examinations may be made only by those Auxiliarists who
have been qualified as Vessel Examiners. An examination will be made only
with the consent, and in the presence, of the owner or operator. It should be
pointed out to everyone connected with the program, and especially to the boat
owner or operator, that this is NOT an official Coast Guard boarding, and is
made solely as helpful service to the boating public.
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, COMMANDANT INSTRUCTION M16790.1C, at 2-2 (1991).
368. Id. at 2-3.
369. Effective civil penalties similar to those for violations found during boardings at sea
are necessary, and civilian members of the Auxiliary cannot exercise this level of enforce-
ment power under current law. See 14 U.S.C. §§ 831, 893.
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olations would still be checked, as unusual circumstances would
provide reasonable suspicion."' 0
Concerns about the effectiveness of drug interdiction under a
reasonable suspicion standard for recreational vessels can be ad-
dressed by considering the history of drug cases involving recrea-
tional vessels. In the vast majority of cases, observable factors have
sufficed to show reasonable suspicion and supported a stop and
boarding of the vessel.3 71 Concealed compartments present a more
complicated problem, but even in instances in which a vessel has
been found smuggling drugs in a concealed compartment, the pres-
ence of some external indicator of a violation of law is likely 
372
The application of new technologies, which is already occurring to
a limited degree, would further facilitate use of a reasonable suspi-
cion standard.373 Similarly, the increase in surveillance and intelli-
gence gathering resulting from the application of Pentagon re-
sources to the drug war should provide a greater quantity and
quality of information on specific vessels known to be carrying con-
370. The limited requirements of reasonable suspicion are illustrated by one court's
comments:
While presence in a suspect area would not, in and of itself, justify a search,
the location of the vessel was certainly a legitimate and important factor for
the Coast Guard to consider. When a small vessel is found in an area where the
typical traffic is involved in either fishing or drug-related activity, and that
vessel lacks the usual earmarks of fishing activity, the Coast Guard may cer-
tainly be suspicious.
United States v. Meadows, 839 F.2d 1489, 1490 n.1 (11th Cir. 1988).
371. The types of vessel conduct that have created reasonable suspicion included maneu-
vering in darkness with no lights, absence of a name or homeport on the exterior of the
vessel, use of a removable name board, refutation of the vessel's claimed nationality by the
asserted flag country, and prior intelligence information identifying the vessel as a suspect.
A sampling of circuit court opinions since 1977 revealed over forty cases in which reasona-
ble suspicion or probable cause existed to justify the boarding before the boarding party
approached the suspect vessel. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 250 (9th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 753 (1991); United States v. Roy, 869 F.2d 1427, 1433 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 818 (1989); United States v. Quemener, 789 F.2d 145, 155 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 829 (1986); United States v. Wray, 748 F.2d 31, 34 (1st Cir.
1984); United States v. Scott, 678 F.2d 606, 610 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 972 (1982);
Blair v. United States, 665 F.2d 500, 505 (4th Cir. 1981). Admittedly, these cases featured
smugglers who were apprehended. Unrepresented are the large majority of cases that were
not appealed or were so clear-cut that the defendant accepted a plea bargain and therefore
no trial or appeal took place.
372. See Roy, 869 F.2d at 1433-34.
373. See FBI devises drug test, supra note 337.
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traband, or vessels observed in traditional drug onload areas. Such
information would provide reasonable suspicion to stop and board
those vessels.
CONCLUSION
In the last twenty years, as national attention has focused on the
deleterious effects of drug abuse upon American society, the public
has nearly unanimously demanded increased law enforcement,
greater prison sentences, and improved education. Congress has
obliged this demand for increased law enforcement.374 Recreational
boaters are already exposed to the possibility of random, totally
discretionary stops and boardings upon the waters. Should Con-
gress perceive a need for increased interdiction efforts, the minimal
privacy presently afforded the recreational boater could be in
danger.
Unless the national will changes to one of tolerance for drug use,
the Coast Guard will continue to play an important role in mini-
mizing the flow of drugs into the country However, the contribu-
tion to this mission by random stops of recreational vessels at sea
does not justify the price in individual freedom and privacy that it
exacts. A requirement of a reasonable suspicion for these boardings
would free significant resources to devote to detecting and stop-
ping the smugglers whose cargoes threaten our society The un-
compromising endorsement of interdiction authority, based in the
fear of being perceived as "soft" on drugs,3 7 5 must be replaced by a
reasoned policy that balances antidrug and privacy interests in or-
der to restore some semblance of Fourth Amendment protection to
the maritime world.
Greg Shelton
374. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971, 1101-1181 (1988).
375. See Zero Tolerance Hearings, supra note 347. A general trend in statements at the
hearings was for the speaker first to declare that he did not mean his remarks to give the
impression that he was soft on drugs; the speaker would then proceed to criticize and ques-
tion the policy and procedures of Zero Tolerance enforcement as being unduly harsh on his
constituent group. See, e.g., id. at 45 (statement of David L. Phelps, owner of seized fishing
vessel); Ld. at 52, 54 (statement of Jerry Schill, Executive Director, North Carolina Fisheries
Ass'n).
[Vol. 34:933
